Results 41 to 50 of about 389 (176)

Economic Harmony—A Rational Theory of Fairness and Cooperation in Strategic Interactions

open access: yesGames, 2022
Experimental studies show that the Nash equilibrium and its refinements are poor predictors of behavior in non-cooperative strategic games. Cooperation models, such as ERC and inequality aversion, yield superior predictions compared to the standard game ...
Ramzi Suleiman
doaj   +1 more source

Adding Realism to Theories of Taxpayer Compliance

open access: yesSouthern Economic Journal, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Explaining why people pay taxes has not been a central focus in the many important contributions of Jim Cox. Even so, I argue here that his work has greatly affected the way that we think about taxpayer compliance, by adding both directly and indirectly much needed realism to the theories and the applications of compliance. These contributions
James Alm
wiley   +1 more source

Is the rent too high? Land ownership and monopoly power

open access: yesReal Estate Economics, EarlyView.
Abstract Pricing power in real estate markets can reduce housing supply and redevelopment relative to the social optimum. We show how pricing power interacts with popular redevelopment subsidies and zoning regulations. Using building‐level rental income data from NYC, we find that increased concentration is correlated with increased rents.
C. Luke Watson, Oren Ziv
wiley   +1 more source

Resource Competition in Blockchain Networks Under Cloud and Device Enabled Participation

open access: yesIEEE Access, 2022
Blockchain technology is a promising resource management architecture due to its ability of building trust in a decentralized transaction. Block mining participants, i.e. miners, are incentivized with reward for successfully mining blocks. Unfortunately,
Yuxiang Liang   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

Stochastic Differential Games for Which the Open-Loop Equilibrium is Subgame Perfect

open access: yesDynamic Games and Applications, 2017
It is generally admitted that a correct forecasting of uncertain variables needs Markov decision rules. In a dynamic game environment, this belief is reinforced if one focuses on credible actions of the players. Usually, subgame perfectness requires equilibrium strategies to be constructed on Markov rules.
Ricardo Josa-Fombellida   +1 more
openaire   +2 more sources

A ninny, an idiot and an economic theorist

open access: yesEconomica, EarlyView.
Abstract Anton Chekhov's story ‘The ninny’ meets the question: ‘What is the meaning of economic theory?’
Ariel Rubinstein
wiley   +1 more source

BACKWARD INDUCTION: MERITS AND FLAWS

open access: yesStudies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 2017
Backward induction (BI) was one of the earliest methods developed for solving finite sequential games with perfect information. It proved to be especially useful in the context of Tom Schelling’s ideas of credible versus incredible threats.
Kamiński Marek M.
doaj   +1 more source

FogCom:SDN-enabled fog node selection for early detection of communicable diseases

open access: yesJournal of King Saud University: Computer and Information Sciences, 2023
A communicable illness is one that spreads from person to person by a number of means, including contact with blood and body fluids, inhaling an airborne virus, or being bitten by an insect.
Joy Lal Sarkar   +8 more
doaj   +1 more source

Applied theory makeovers

open access: yesEconomica, EarlyView.
Abstract I argue that economists' distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ economic theory is often based on papers' stylistic markers rather than their methodology or scope. I illustrate this point with a model of price competition for boundedly rational consumers, due to Piccione and Spiegler. I first present its original, ‘pure style’ version.
Ran Spiegler
wiley   +1 more source

Randomly Albright: The End of Judge Shopping in the Western District of Texas?

open access: yesJournal of Empirical Legal Studies, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Because judges exercise discretion in how they handle and decide cases, heterogeneity across judges can affect case outcomes and, thus, preferences among litigants for particular judges. However, selection obscures the causal mechanisms that drive these preferences.
Christian Helmers   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

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