Results 51 to 60 of about 337 (136)
Comparison Between Seller and Buyer Pricing Systems for Energy Trading in Microgrids
In this paper, two systems for energy trading among energy prosumers are proposed: a buyer-pricing-system (BPS), in which buyers determine the price of energy and a seller-pricing-system (SPS) in which sellers determine the price of energy.
Sohee Bae, Sangdon Park
doaj +1 more source
ABSTRACT Biased recommendations arise naturally in markets with heterogeneous consumers. We study a model in which a monopolist offers an experience good to a population of consumers with heterogeneous tastes and makes personalized purchase recommendations.
Martin Peitz, Anton Sobolev
wiley +1 more source
Critical Discount Factor Values in Discounted Supergames
This paper examines the subgame-perfect equilibria in symmetric 2×2 supergames. We solve the smallest discount factor value for which the players obtain all the feasible and individually rational payoffs as equilibrium payoffs.
Kimmo Berg, Markus Kärki
doaj +1 more source
Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?
ABSTRACT Pay‐TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit.
David Martimort, Jerome Pouyet
wiley +1 more source
The problem of distributed estimation in energy-harvesting wireless sensor networks (EH-WSNs) is studied. In general, the energy state of an energy-harvesting sensor varies dramatically.
Hua Liu +4 more
doaj +1 more source
Cross‐border reciprocal bartering in public–private tetradic networks
Abstract Under the background of semiconductor and vaccine shortages during COVID‐19‐driven supply chain disruptions, this article adopts a multimethodological approach to investigate strategic solutions for cross‐border scarce goods bartering in a public–private (P–P) tetradic reciprocal network, which involves two pairs of P–P collaborative dyads ...
Jiuh‐Biing Sheu +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Bargaining over Strategies of Non-Cooperative Games
We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game.
Giuseppe Attanasi +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Leader‐Follower Dynamics in Shareholder Activism
ABSTRACT We propose a theory of coordination and influence among blockholders. Privately informed activists time their trades in sequence to lower acquisition costs, prompting a strategic use of order flows: leader activists create trading gains for their followers, ultimately influencing their willingness to bear greater value‐enhancing intervention ...
DORUK CETEMEN +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Resource Management Framework Based on the Stackelberg Game in Vehicular Edge Computing
With the emergence and development of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), quick response time and ultralow delay are required. Cloud computing services are unfavorable for reducing delay and response time.
Guang-Shun Li +5 more
doaj +1 more source
ABSTRACT We develop a unified theory of blockholder governance and the voting premium in a setting without takeovers or controlling shareholders. A voting premium emerges when a minority blockholder can influence shareholder composition by accumulating votes and buying shares from dissenting shareholders.
DORON LEVIT, NADYA MALENKO, ERNST MAUG
wiley +1 more source

