Results 61 to 70 of about 389 (176)
Comparison Between Seller and Buyer Pricing Systems for Energy Trading in Microgrids
IEEE Access, 2019 In this paper, two systems for energy trading among energy prosumers are proposed: a buyer-pricing-system (BPS), in which buyers determine the price of energy and a seller-pricing-system (SPS) in which sellers determine the price of energy.
Sohee Bae, Sangdon Park
doaj +1 more source
Solution of mathematical programming formulations of subgame perfect equilibrium problems [PDF]
, 1992 Mathematical programming models have been developed to represent imperfectly competitive (oligopolistic) market structures and the interdependencies of decision-making units in establishing prices and production levels. The solution of these models represents an economic equilibrium.
Macal, C. M., Hurter, A. P.
openaire +2 more sources
Endogenous Institution Formation for Public Good Provision
The Manchester School, Volume 94, Issue 5, Page 497-507, September 2026.ABSTRACT We revisit an existing framework of endogenous institution formation for public good provision, incorporating heterogeneous players to address the question, “Who joins an institution that sanctions only its members to provide a public good?” We analyze two models with different sources of heterogeneity.
Daehong Min, Doojin Ryu
wiley +1 more source
Critical Discount Factor Values in Discounted Supergames
Games, 2018 This paper examines the subgame-perfect equilibria in symmetric 2×2 supergames. We solve the smallest discount factor value for which the players obtain all the feasible and individually rational payoffs as equilibrium payoffs.
Kimmo Berg, Markus Kärki
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Theoretical Economics, 2017 Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE payoffs: any SPE obtained using public randomization can be
Barelli, Paulo, Duggan, John
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The Manchester School, Volume 94, Issue 5, Page 571-588, September 2026.ABSTRACT This study considers mutual outsourcing firms in a vertically related market and examines their strategic adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) activities. We demonstrate that ECSR adoption reduces mutual outsourcing firms' profits, resulting in a prisoner's dilemma situation, but enhances welfare regardless of ...
Lili Xu, Xinying Fan, Sang‐Ho Lee
wiley +1 more source
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, 2014 The problem of distributed estimation in energy-harvesting wireless sensor networks (EH-WSNs) is studied. In general, the energy state of an energy-harvesting sensor varies dramatically.
Hua Liu +4 more
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Knowledge Spillover Network and Optimal R&D Policy in Oligopoly
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Volume 28, Issue 4, August 2026.ABSTRACT This paper studies optimal R&D policy in a Cournot oligopoly with network‐based knowledge spillovers. Generalizing the standard two‐stage model of Kamien et al. (1992), we characterize the socially optimal policy by decomposing the net externality of private innovation into three channels: the market expansion effect, direct knowledge ...
Jun‐Hyung Lee
wiley +1 more source
Bargaining over Strategies of Non-Cooperative Games
Games, 2015 We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game.
Giuseppe Attanasi +3 more
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Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war
American Journal of Political Science, Volume 70, Issue 3, Page 1164-1180, July 2026.Abstract War is often viewed as a bargaining problem. However, prior to bargaining, countries can vie for leverage by expending effort on diplomacy. This article presents a dynamic model of conflict where agenda‐setting power is endogenous to pre‐bargaining diplomatic competition.
Joseph J. Ruggiero
wiley +1 more source