Auctioning the Right to Play Ultimatum Games and the Impact on Equilibrium Selection
Games, 2013 We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees.
Jason Shachat, J. Todd Swarthout
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The Decision Whether to Hire Managers in a Mixed Duopoly with State-Owned and Labor-Managed Firms [PDF]
International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics, 2020 This paper considers a mixed duopoly model in which a state-owned firm competes with a labor-managed firm. The timing of this game is as follows. In the first stage, each firm decides whether or not to hire a manager.
Kazuhiro Ohnishi
doaj
A Note on Stabilizing Cooperation in the Centipede Game
Games, 2020 In the much-studied Centipede Game, which resembles the Iterated Prisoners’ Dilemma, two players successively choose between (1) cooperating, by continuing play, or (2) defecting and terminating play.
Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour
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On gamesmen and fair men: explaining fairness in non-cooperative bargaining games [PDF]
Royal Society Open Science, 2018 Experiments on bargaining games have repeatedly shown that subjects fail to use backward induction, and that they only rarely make demands in accordance with the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Ramzi Suleiman
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Exploring the Gap between Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium
Games, 2016 In (Bonanno, 2013), a solution concept for extensive-form games, called perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), was introduced and shown to be a strict refinement of subgame-perfect equilibrium; it was also shown that, in turn, sequential equilibrium (SE) is
Giacomo Bonanno
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The Complexity of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Quantitative Reachability Games [PDF]
Logical Methods in Computer Science, 2020 We study multiplayer quantitative reachability games played on a finite directed graph, where the objective of each player is to reach his target set of vertices as quickly as possible.
Thomas Brihaye +4 more
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Simulation of the Stackelberg–Hotelling Game
GamesThis work studies the Hotelling game with sequential choice of prices, that is, the Stackelberg–Hotelling (SHOT) game. The game is studied through numerical simulation, which provides the subgame perfect equilibrium solution not only in the unrestricted ...
Luis Garcia-Perez +3 more
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R&D Organization and Corporate Social Responsibility Specialization
Managerial and Decision Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT In this paper, we examine whether the scope of corporate social responsibility (CSR) should be broad or narrow. A broad scope covers both production and R&D investment decisions, while a narrow scope applies only to production decisions. We show that both firms' choices and the government's preferences depend on the level of CSR concern and on
Quan Dong +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Stationary Markov Equilibrium Strategies in Asynchronous Stochastic Games: Existence and Computation
AlgorithmsWe study Asynchronous Dynamic games and show that in games with a finite state space and finite action sets, one can obtain the pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium by using a simple backward induction method when the time period for the game is ...
Subir. K. Chakrabarti +2 more
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Are Start‐Up Acquisitions by Dominant Firms Driving Innovation or Killing Competition?
Managerial and Decision Economics, EarlyView.ABSTRACT This paper develops a sequential model to examine start‐up acquisitions in markets with network externalities, incorporating a pre‐entry strategic buyout option that allows the incumbent to integrate the start‐up's innovation, followed by post‐entry expenditure on coordination advertising, and defensive pricing strategies.
Adele Whelan, Kate Hynes
wiley +1 more source