Results 51 to 60 of about 2,714 (212)

Randomly Albright: The End of Judge Shopping in the Western District of Texas?

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Because judges exercise discretion in how they handle and decide cases, heterogeneity across judges can affect case outcomes and, thus, preferences among litigants for particular judges. However, selection obscures the causal mechanisms that drive these preferences.
Christian Helmers, Bernhard Ganglmair, Brian J. Love   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

BACKWARD INDUCTION: MERITS AND FLAWS

Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 2017
Backward induction (BI) was one of the earliest methods developed for solving finite sequential games with perfect information. It proved to be especially useful in the context of Tom Schelling’s ideas of credible versus incredible threats.
Kamiński Marek M.
doaj   +1 more source

RPM and Vertical Integration With Upstream Competition and Noncontractible Efforts

The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We study RPM and vertical integration in a common agency setting with two differentiated manufacturers and one retailer, where consumer demand depends on both the manufacturers' and retailer's noncontractible efforts. Under vertical separation, the adoption of maximum RPM by both manufacturers is an equilibrium and intensifies competition ...
Michele Bisceglia, Mark Israel, Salvatore Piccolo, Paolo Ramezzana   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source

Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments [Game theory]

, 2011
Educação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::EconomiaPresents a class that analyzes some games using a new solution concept created by the Professor and students, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
Polak, Ben
core   +1 more source

Bad NGOs? Competition in the Market for Donations and Workers' Misconduct

The Journal of Industrial Economics, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate how competition among NGOs to attract donations shapes the incentives that NGOs provide to their employees. NGOs hire workers to undertake development projects, which are horizontally and vertically differentiated.
Nadia Burani, Ester Manna
wiley   +1 more source

Robust Mean–Variance Portfolio Optimization: Mean–Variance–Variance Criterion Versus Mean–Variance–Standard Deviation Criterion

Mathematical Finance, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We study a dynamic portfolio optimization problem under the mean–variance–variance (M‐V‐V) criterion proposed by Maccheroni et al. It is an analogue of the Arrow–Pratt approximation to the well‐known smooth ambiguity model. Under the standard Black–Scholes framework, we derive fully explicit equilibrium investment strategies in which a DM's ...
David Landriault, Bin Li, Yuanyuan Zhang
wiley   +1 more source

Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments [Game theory]

, 2016
Educação Superior::Ciências Sociais Aplicadas::EconomiaPresents a class that analyzes some games using a new solution concept created by the Professor and students, subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE).
Polak, Ben
core   +1 more source

Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation

Games, 2021
This paper studies how to form an efficient coalition—a group of people. More specifically, we compare two mechanisms for forming a coalition by running a laboratory experiment and reveal which mechanism leads to higher social surplus. In one setting, we
Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki, Taro Shinoda   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

Stochastic Differential Games for Which the Open-Loop Equilibrium is Subgame Perfect

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2017
It is generally admitted that a correct forecasting of uncertain variables needs Markov decision rules. In a dynamic game environment, this belief is reinforced if one focuses on credible actions of the players. Usually, subgame perfectness requires equilibrium strategies to be constructed on Markov rules.
Ricardo Josa-Fombellida, Juan Pablo Rincón-Zapatero   +1 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Biased News Media and the Swing Voter's Decision in Repeated Games

The Manchester School, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We consider a monopolistic, biased news media platform that attempts to influence the decision of swing voters with cheap talk when voting is costly and abstaining is an option. First, we demonstrate that, while no fully communicative equilibrium exists in a stage game, a partially truth‐revealing mixed‐strategy equilibrium exists.
Jooyong Jun, Jeong‐Yoo Kim
wiley   +1 more source