Results 71 to 80 of about 2,714 (212)

Inflated Recommendations

open access: yesThe RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 57, Issue 2, Page 368-385, Summer 2026.
ABSTRACT Biased recommendations arise naturally in markets with heterogeneous consumers. We study a model in which a monopolist offers an experience good to a population of consumers with heterogeneous tastes and makes personalized purchase recommendations.
Martin Peitz, Anton Sobolev
wiley   +1 more source

Critical Discount Factor Values in Discounted Supergames

open access: yesGames, 2018
This paper examines the subgame-perfect equilibria in symmetric 2×2 supergames. We solve the smallest discount factor value for which the players obtain all the feasible and individually rational payoffs as equilibrium payoffs.
Kimmo Berg, Markus Kärki
doaj   +1 more source

A Formal Definition of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for Extensive Games [PDF]

open access: yes
Often, perfect bayesian equilibrium is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given some beliefs in which Bayes rule is applied “whenever possible”.
Miguel Melendez-Jimenez   +1 more
core  

Why Is Exclusivity in Broadcasting Rights Prevalent and Why Does Simple Regulation Fail?

open access: yesThe RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 57, Issue 2, Page 402-419, Summer 2026.
ABSTRACT Pay‐TV firms compete both downstream to attract viewers and upstream to acquire broadcasting rights. Because profits inherited from downstream competition satisfy a convexity property, allocating rights to the dominant firm maximizes the industry profit.
David Martimort, Jerome Pouyet
wiley   +1 more source

Adaptive Quantization for Distributed Estimation in Energy-Harvesting Wireless Sensor Networks: A Game-Theoretic Approach

open access: yesInternational Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, 2014
The problem of distributed estimation in energy-harvesting wireless sensor networks (EH-WSNs) is studied. In general, the energy state of an energy-harvesting sensor varies dramatically.
Hua Liu   +4 more
doaj   +1 more source

Cross‐border reciprocal bartering in public–private tetradic networks

open access: yesDecision Sciences, Volume 57, Issue 3, Page 213-234, June 2026.
Abstract Under the background of semiconductor and vaccine shortages during COVID‐19‐driven supply chain disruptions, this article adopts a multimethodological approach to investigate strategic solutions for cross‐border scarce goods bartering in a public–private (P–P) tetradic reciprocal network, which involves two pairs of P–P collaborative dyads ...
Jiuh‐Biing Sheu   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Bargaining over Strategies of Non-Cooperative Games

open access: yesGames, 2015
We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game.
Giuseppe Attanasi   +3 more
doaj   +1 more source

Leader‐Follower Dynamics in Shareholder Activism

open access: yesThe Journal of Finance, Volume 81, Issue 3, Page 1377-1435, June 2026.
ABSTRACT We propose a theory of coordination and influence among blockholders. Privately informed activists time their trades in sequence to lower acquisition costs, prompting a strategic use of order flows: leader activists create trading gains for their followers, ultimately influencing their willingness to bear greater value‐enhancing intervention ...
DORUK CETEMEN   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source

Resource Management Framework Based on the Stackelberg Game in Vehicular Edge Computing

open access: yesComplexity, 2020
With the emergence and development of the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), quick response time and ultralow delay are required. Cloud computing services are unfavorable for reducing delay and response time.
Guang-Shun Li   +5 more
doaj   +1 more source

Three essays on game theory [PDF]

open access: yes, 2007
The main text of this thesis is divided into three chapters. The three papers are contributions to the literature on equilibrium refinements in noncooperative game theory. Each chapter can be read independently of the rest.
González Pimienta, Carlos
core  

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