Results 61 to 70 of about 2,714 (212)

Endogenous Institution Formation for Public Good Provision

open access: yesThe Manchester School, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We revisit an existing framework of endogenous institution formation for public good provision, incorporating heterogeneous players to address the question, “Who joins an institution that sanctions only its members to provide a public good?” We analyze two models with different sources of heterogeneity.
Daehong Min, Doojin Ryu
wiley   +1 more source

Two-Player Location Game in a Closed-Loop Market with Quantity Competition

open access: yesComplexity, 2020
This paper considers the two-player location game in a closed-loop market with quantity competition. Based on the Cournot and Hotelling models, a circle model is established for a closed-loop market in which two players (firms) play a location game under
Xiaofeng Chen   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

Mutual Outsourcing in a Vertically Related Market With Strategic Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility

open access: yesThe Manchester School, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This study considers mutual outsourcing firms in a vertically related market and examines their strategic adoption of environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) activities. We demonstrate that ECSR adoption reduces mutual outsourcing firms' profits, resulting in a prisoner's dilemma situation, but enhances welfare regardless of ...
Lili Xu, Xinying Fan, Sang‐Ho Lee
wiley   +1 more source

Consumers' Environmental Awareness and Firms' Managerial Delegation Contracts Under Emission Tax Policies

open access: yesScottish Journal of Political Economy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This study considers consumers' environmental awareness of polluting firms' managerial delegation contracts and compares the effects of committed and time‐consistent emission tax policies. It reveals that when environmental performance (EP) incentives prevail, sales performance (SP) incentives depend on the emission tax type and competition ...
Lili Xu, Yuntong Yin, Sang‐Ho Lee
wiley   +1 more source

Storage games

open access: yesThe RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 57, Issue 2, Page 334-348, Summer 2026.
ABSTRACT We study a long‐horizon, oligopolistic market with random shocks to demand that can be arbitraged by two storage operators with finite capacity. This problem applies to any storable commodity—that is, most commodities. Because the arbitrage spread is so sensitive to market power, storage operators face strong incentives to restrain quantities ...
Sergei Balakin, Guillaume Roger
wiley   +1 more source

The Subgame-Perfect Core [PDF]

open access: yes, 2016
We propose a cooperative solution concept for general extensive games that can improve upon subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. This new concept, which we label the subgame-perfect core, is a refinement of the core of the extensive game in the same sense ...
Wooders, Myrna, Chander, Parkash
core   +2 more sources

Stackelberg games-based distributed algorithm of pricing and resource allocation in heterogeneous wireless networks

open access: yesTongxin xuebao, 2013
To deal with resource allocation in heterogeneous wireless networks,an algorithm based on multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg games model was proposed to satisfy optimal utility of both operators and mobile users.The mobile user’s utility function ...
Yong JIANG, Shan-zhi CHEN, Bo HU
doaj   +2 more sources

Comparison Between Seller and Buyer Pricing Systems for Energy Trading in Microgrids

open access: yesIEEE Access, 2019
In this paper, two systems for energy trading among energy prosumers are proposed: a buyer-pricing-system (BPS), in which buyers determine the price of energy and a seller-pricing-system (SPS) in which sellers determine the price of energy.
Sohee Bae, Sangdon Park
doaj   +1 more source

Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures [PDF]

open access: yesTheory and Decision, 2016
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire   +1 more source

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy