Results 81 to 90 of about 6,583 (183)

Phenomenal knowledge and phenomenal causality

open access: yesNoûs, Volume 60, Issue 1, Page 212-232, March 2026.
Abstract There has been extensive debate over whether we can have phenomenal knowledge in the case of epiphenomenalism. This article aims to bring that debate to a close. I first develop a refined causal account of knowledge—one that is modest enough to avoid various putative problems, yet sufficiently robust to undermine the epiphenomenalist position.
Lei Zhong
wiley   +1 more source

A Modest Conception of Moral Right & Wrong

open access: yesAnalytic Philosophy, Volume 67, Issue 1, Page 72-82, March 2026.
ABSTRACT Taking inspiration from Hume, I advance a conception of the part of morality concerned with right and wrong, rooted in the actual moral rules established and followed within our society. Elsewhere, I have argued this approach provides a way of thinking about how we are genuinely “bound in a moral way” to keep our moral obligations that it is ...
Jorah Dannenberg
wiley   +1 more source

L’ira come disvalore: Senofonte contro Omero

open access: yesErga-Logoi
Anger as a disvalue: Xenophon versus Homer The paper analyzes the attestations of ὀργή, ὀργίζομαι and χαλεπαίνω in the corpus of Xenophon and compares the concept of anger that emerges with that found in the Homeric poems, particularly the Iliad.
Roberto Nicolai
doaj   +1 more source

How to Think About Tacit (or Implicit) Beliefs

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 112, Issue 2, Page 335-345, March 2026.
ABSTRACT This paper defends a novel theory of tacit belief (sometimes called “implicit belief”). After providing some background and taxonomy, I argue that dispositionalist theories of belief fail to provide a good account of tacit beliefs; this failure gives us a reason to reject those dispositionalist theories.
Andrew Moon
wiley   +1 more source

Dispositions and Dependence

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 112, Issue 2, Page 510-526, March 2026.
ABSTRACT According to the principle No Upwards Essence, there are no cases in which some x$x$ essentially depends on y$y$, yet grounds y$y$. One of the most pressing objections that afflict Dispositional Essentialism (DE) is that it violates No Upwards Essence and is therefore untenable. In this paper, I defend DE against this objection. First, I argue
Lisa Vogt
wiley   +1 more source

"Socratic" dialogues [PDF]

open access: yesPlato Journal, 2009
M. Bonazzi   +4 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Meaning, anti‐alienation, and fulfillment

open access: yesThe Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 64, Issue 1, Page 104-122, March 2026.
Abstract One intuition that motivates subjectivist theories about meaning in life is the anti‐alienation intuition, that is, for a life to be meaningful it must engage with the person whose life it is. This article contends that the anti‐alienation and subjectivist theories it motivates are best understood as tracking fulfillment in life; this is an ...
Chad Mason Stevenson
wiley   +1 more source

SOKRATES SORUNU

open access: yesFelsefe Dünyası, 2007
Mehmet ÖNAL, "SOKRATES SORUNU", FELSEFE DÜNYASI DERGİSİ, SAYI ...
Mehmet Önal
doaj  

Socrates [PDF]

open access: yes2014 IEEE High Performance Extreme Computing Conference (HPEC), 2014
C. Savkli   +4 more
  +4 more sources

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