Results 11 to 20 of about 963,583 (273)
We introduce the {\sc classified stable matching} problem, a problem motivated by academic hiring. Suppose that a number of institutes are hiring faculty members from a pool of applicants.
Huang, Chien-Chung
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Maximum Locally Stable Matchings [PDF]
Motivated by the observation that most companies are more likely to consider job applicants referred by their employees than those who applied on their own, Arcaute and Vassilvitskii modeled a job market that integrates social networks into stable ...
Eric McDermid, Christine T. Cheng
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Understanding Popular Matchings via Stable Matchings [PDF]
Let $G = (A \cup B, E)$ be an instance of the stable marriage problem with strict preference lists. A matching $M$ is popular in $G$ if $M$ does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every stable matching is a min-size popular matching; another subclass of popular matchings that always exist and can be easily ...
Ágnes Cseh +3 more
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In this paper we consider the issue of a unique prediction in one to one two sided matching markets, as defined by Gale and Shapley (1962), and we prove the following. Theorem. Let P be a one-to-one two-sided matching market and let P be its associated normal form, a (weakly) smaller matching market with the same set of stable matchings, that can be ...
Gregory Z. Gutin +2 more
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Stable fractional matchings [PDF]
We study a generalization of the classical stable matching problem that allows for cardinal preferences (as opposed to ordinal) and fractional matchings (as opposed to integral). After observing that, in this cardinal setting, stable fractional matchings can have much higher social welfare than stable integral ones, our goal is to understand the ...
Ioannis Caragiannis +3 more
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Jointly stable matchings [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Shuichi Miyazaki, Kazuya Okamoto
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Conditional stable matchings [PDF]
In matching theory of contracts the substitutes condition plays an essential role to ensure the existence of stable matchings. We study many-to-many matchings where groups of individuals, of size possibly greater than two, are matched to a set of institutions.
Vilmos Komornik, Christelle Viauroux
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Matching Dynamics with Constraints [PDF]
We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets.
A. Bogomolnaia +22 more
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Stability and Median Rationalizability for Aggregate Matchings
We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies and establish fundamental properties of stable matchings including the result that the set of stable matchings is a non-empty, complete, and distributive lattice ...
Federico Echenique +3 more
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11 pages, 9 figures (v2: minor changes, published version)
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