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Maximum Locally Stable Matchings [PDF]
Motivated by the observation that most companies are more likely to consider job applicants referred by their employees than those who applied on their own, Arcaute and Vassilvitskii modeled a job market that integrates social networks into stable ...
Eric McDermid, Christine T. Cheng
doaj +4 more sources
On Stable Matchings and Flows [PDF]
We describe a flow model related to ordinary network flows the same way as stable matchings are related to maximum matchings in bipartite graphs. We prove that there always exists a stable flow and generalize the lattice structure of stable marriages to ...
Tamás Fleiner
doaj +6 more sources
Extracting Systemic Anticancer Treatment Lines from the Danish National Patient Registry for Solid Tumour Patients Treated in the North Denmark Region Between 2009 and 2019 [PDF]
Charles Vesteghem,1,2 Martin Bøgsted,1,2 Deirdre Cronin-Fenton,3 Laurids Østergaard Poulsen2,4 1Center for Clinical Data Science, Aalborg University and Aalborg University Hospital, Aalborg, Denmark; 2Clinical Cancer Research Centre, Aalborg University ...
Vesteghem C +3 more
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Characterization of Dynamics of Stable Matchings: Attractors Mapped from Stable Matchings
AbstractThis note characterizes the dynamic structure of stable matchings of the stable marriage problem (SMP). The characterization focuses on the dynamic process of how the stable matching will be attained. To this end, the discrete problem of the SMP will be mapped to nonlinear dynamical models whose attractors include the counterparts of the stable
Yoshiteru Ishida, Takumi Satou
exaly +3 more sources
Stability and Median Rationalizability for Aggregate Matchings
We develop the theory of stability for aggregate matchings used in empirical studies and establish fundamental properties of stable matchings including the result that the set of stable matchings is a non-empty, complete, and distributive lattice ...
Federico Echenique +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Gale and Shapley introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents where each agent on one side has an exogenous preference ordering over the agents on the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can both improve their utility by forming a new pair.
Felipe Garrido-Lucero, Rida Laraki
openaire +4 more sources
In this paper we consider the issue of a unique prediction in one to one two sided matching markets, as defined by Gale and Shapley (1962), and we prove the following. Theorem. Let P be a one-to-one two-sided matching market and let P be its associated normal form, a (weakly) smaller matching market with the same set of stable matchings, that can be ...
Gregory Z. Gutin +2 more
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Stable fractional matchings [PDF]
We study a generalization of the classical stable matching problem that allows for cardinal preferences (as opposed to ordinal) and fractional matchings (as opposed to integral). After observing that, in this cardinal setting, stable fractional matchings can have much higher social welfare than stable integral ones, our goal is to understand the ...
Ioannis Caragiannis +3 more
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We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms—quantile stable mechanisms—that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market.
Peter Chen +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Jointly stable matchings [PDF]
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Shuichi Miyazaki, Kazuya Okamoto
openaire +7 more sources

