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Maximum Locally Stable Matchings [PDF]
Algorithms, 2013 Motivated by the observation that most companies are more likely to consider job applicants referred by their employees than those who applied on their own, Arcaute and Vassilvitskii modeled a job market that integrates social networks into stable ...
Eric McDermid, Christine T. Cheng
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Games and Economic Behavior, 2023 In this paper we consider the issue of a unique prediction in one to one two sided matching markets, as defined by Gale and Shapley (1962), and we prove the following. Theorem. Let P be a one-to-one two-sided matching market and let P be its associated normal form, a (weakly) smaller matching market with the same set of stable matchings, that can be ...
Gregory Z. Gutin +2 more
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Essentially stable matchings [PDF]
Games and Economic Behavior, 2020 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Peter Troyan +2 more
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Saturating stable matchings [PDF]
Operations Research Letters, 2021 10 pages, 2 figures.
M. Maaz
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On Stable Matchings and Flows [PDF]
Algorithms, 2014 We describe a flow model related to ordinary network flows the same way as stable matchings are related to maximum matchings in bipartite graphs. We prove that there always exists a stable flow and generalize the lattice structure of stable marriages to ...
Tamás Fleiner
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Jointly stable matchings [PDF]
Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2019 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Shuichi Miyazaki, Kazuya Okamoto
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Characterization of Super-Stable Matchings [PDF]
Workshop on Algorithms and Data Structures, 2021 An instance of the super-stable matching problem with incomplete lists and ties is an undirected bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B, E)$, with an adjacency list being a linearly ordered list of ties. Ties are subsets of vertices equally good for a given vertex.
Changyong Hu, Vijay K. Garg
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Understanding Popular Matchings via Stable Matchings [PDF]
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, 2022 Let $G = (A \cup B, E)$ be an instance of the stable marriage problem with strict preference lists. A matching $M$ is popular in $G$ if $M$ does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every stable matching is a min-size popular matching; another subclass of popular matchings that always exist and can be easily ...
Ágnes Cseh +3 more
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Stable fractional matchings [PDF]
Artificial Intelligence, 2019 We study a generalization of the classical stable matching problem that allows for cardinal preferences (as opposed to ordinal) and fractional matchings (as opposed to integral). After observing that, in this cardinal setting, stable fractional matchings can have much higher social welfare than stable integral ones, our goal is to understand the ...
Ioannis Caragiannis +3 more
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CoRRWe show how fragile stable matchings are in a decentralized one-to-one matching setting. The classical work of Roth and Vande Vate (1990) suggests simple decentralized dynamics in which randomly-chosen blocking pairs match successively. Such decentralized interactions guarantee convergence to a stable matching.
Kirill Rudov
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