Results 11 to 20 of about 1,725,881 (271)
Understanding Popular Matchings via Stable Matchings [PDF]
Let $G = (A \cup B, E)$ be an instance of the stable marriage problem with strict preference lists. A matching $M$ is popular in $G$ if $M$ does not lose a head-to-head election against any matching where vertices are voters. Every stable matching is a min-size popular matching; another subclass of popular matchings that always exist and can be easily ...
Ágnes Cseh +3 more
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Essentially stable matchings [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Peter Troyan +2 more
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Saturating stable matchings [PDF]
10 pages, 2 figures.
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Stable marriages and search frictions [PDF]
Stable matchings are the primary solution concept for two-sided matching markets with nontransferable utility. We investigate the strategic foundations of stability in a decentralized matching market.
Nöldeke, Georg, Lauermann, Stephan
core +1 more source
Characterization of Super-Stable Matchings [PDF]
An instance of the super-stable matching problem with incomplete lists and ties is an undirected bipartite graph $G = (A \cup B, E)$, with an adjacency list being a linearly ordered list of ties. Ties are subsets of vertices equally good for a given vertex.
Changyong Hu, Vijay K. Garg
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"Almost stable" matchings in the Roommates problem [PDF]
An instance of the classical Stable Roommates problem (SR) need not admit a stable matching. This motivates the problem of finding a matching that is “as stable as possible”, i.e. admits the fewest number of blocking pairs. In this paper we prove that,
David J. Abraham +6 more
core +1 more source
In this paper, the notion of stability is extended to network flows over time. As a useful device in our proofs, we present an elegant preflow-push variant of the Gale-Shapley algorithm that operates directly on the given network and computes stable ...
Jannik Matuschke +2 more
doaj +1 more source
Faster and Simpler Approximation of Stable Matchings
We give a 3 2 -approximation algorithm for finding stable matchings that runs in O(m) time. The previous most well-known algorithm, by McDermid, has the same approximation ratio but runs in O(n3/2m) time, where n denotes the number of people andm ...
Katarzyna Paluch
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Constrainedness in Stable Matching
In constraint satisfaction problems, constrainedness provides a way to predict the number of solutions: for instances of a same size, the number of constraints is inversely correlated with the number of solutions. However, there is no obvious equivalent metric for stable matching problems.
Escamocher, Guillaume +1 more
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Conditional stable matchings [PDF]
In matching theory of contracts the substitutes condition plays an essential role to ensure the existence of stable matchings. We study many-to-many matchings where groups of individuals, of size possibly greater than two, are matched to a set of institutions.
Vilmos Komornik, Christelle Viauroux
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