Results 21 to 30 of about 3,739,569 (169)

The revealed preference theory of stable matchings with one-sided preferences

open access: yesGames Econ. Behav., 2020
We investigate the testable implications of the theory of stable matchings in two-sided matching markets with one-sided preferences. Our main result connects the revealed preference analysis to the well-known lattice structure of the set of stable ...
Gaoji Hu, Jiangtao Li, Rui Tang
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Adapting Stable Matchings to Evolving Preferences [PDF]

open access: yesAAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2019
Adaptivity to changing environments and constraints is key to success in modern society. We address this by proposing “incrementalized versions” of Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates. That is, we try to answer the following question: for both problems,
Robert Bredereck   +4 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Conditional stable matchings [PDF]

open access: yesActa Scientiarum Mathematicarum, 2013
In matching theory of contracts the substitutes condition plays an essential role to ensure the existence of stable matchings. We study many-to-many matchings where groups of individuals, of size possibly greater than two, are matched to a set of institutions.
Vilmos Komornik, Christelle Viauroux
openaire   +2 more sources

Two-Sided Matching with Indifferences: Using Heuristics to Improve Properties of Stable Matchings

open access: yesComputational Economics, 2020
Two-Sided Matching is a widely used approach to allocate resources based on preferences. In Two-Sided Matching problems where indifferences are allowed in the preference lists, finding stable matchings with certain properties is known to be NP-hard and ...
C. Haas
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Stable Flows over Time

open access: yesAlgorithms, 2013
In this paper, the notion of stability is extended to network flows over time. As a useful device in our proofs, we present an elegant preflow-push variant of the Gale-Shapley algorithm that operates directly on the given network and computes stable ...
Jannik Matuschke   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

Constrainedness in Stable Matching

open access: yes2018 IEEE 30th International Conference on Tools with Artificial Intelligence (ICTAI), 2018
In constraint satisfaction problems, constrainedness provides a way to predict the number of solutions: for instances of a same size, the number of constraints is inversely correlated with the number of solutions. However, there is no obvious equivalent metric for stable matching problems.
Escamocher, Guillaume, O'Sullivan, Barry
openaire   +2 more sources

Mallows permutations as stable matchings [PDF]

open access: yesCanadian Journal of Mathematics - Journal Canadien de Mathematiques, 2018
We show that the Mallows measure on permutations of $1,\dots ,n$ arises as the law of the unique Gale–Shapley stable matching of the random bipartite graph with vertex set conditioned to be perfect, where preferences arise from the natural total ...
Omer Angel   +3 more
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Faster and Simpler Approximation of Stable Matchings

open access: yesAlgorithms, 2014
We give a 3 2 -approximation algorithm for finding stable matchings that runs in O(m) time. The previous most well-known algorithm, by McDermid, has the same approximation ratio but runs in O(n3/2m) time, where n denotes the number of people andm ...
Katarzyna Paluch
doaj   +1 more source

A simply exponential upper bound on the maximum number of stable matchings [PDF]

open access: yesSymposium on the Theory of Computing, 2017
Stable matching is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley.
Anna R. Karlin, S. Gharan, Robbie Weber
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Budget Constraints [PDF]

open access: yesInternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2017
This paper examines two-sided matching with budget constraints where one side (a firm or hospital) can make monetary transfers (offer wages) to the other (a worker or doctor).
Yasushi Kawase, Atsushi Iwasaki
semanticscholar   +1 more source

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