Results 21 to 30 of about 1,725,881 (271)
Popular matchings in the marriage and roommates problems [PDF]
Popular matchings have recently been a subject of study in the context of the so-called House Allocation Problem, where the objective is to match applicants to houses over which the applicants have preferences.
Biró, P. +5 more
core +1 more source
"Almost stable" matchings in the roommates problem with bounded preference lists [PDF]
An instance of the classical Stable Roommates problem need not admit a stable matching. Previous work has considered the problem of finding a matching that is “as stable as possible”, i.e., admits the minimum number of blocking pairs.
Biró, Péter +7 more
core +1 more source
The Study of Lattice Structure of Bipartite Stable Matchings With Flexible Agents
In this paper, we obtain a set of pairwise stable outcomes in two-sided hybrid matching market with price externalities. In this market, the valuation of agents depends upon money.
B. Shaukat +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Improving Man-Optimal Stable Matchings by Minimum Change of Preference Lists
In the stable marriage problem, any instance admits the so-called man-optimal stable matching, in which every man is assigned the best possible partner.
Shuichi Miyazaki +4 more
doaj +1 more source
Local Search Approaches in Stable Matching Problems
The stable marriage (SM) problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools or, more generally, to any two-sided market.
Toby Walsh +4 more
doaj +1 more source
A Note on the Uniqueness of Stable Marriage Matching
In this note we present some sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of a stable matching in the Gale-Shapley marriage classical model of even size. We also state the result on the existence of exactly two stable matchings in the marriage problem of odd
Drgas-Burchardt Ewa
doaj +1 more source
Popular matchings: structure and algorithms [PDF]
An instance of the popular matching problem (POP-M) consists of a set of applicants and a set of posts. Each applicant has a preference list that strictly ranks a subset of the posts.
Irving, R.W. +3 more
core +1 more source
Monte Carlo Inference on Two-Sided Matching Models
This paper considers two-sided matching models with nontransferable utilities, with one side having homogeneous preferences over the other side.
Taehoon Kim +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Dynamically stable matching [PDF]
I introduce a stability notion,dynamic stability, for two‐sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one‐to‐one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two conceptual issues. First, since not all agents are available to match at the same time, one must establish which agents ...
openaire +3 more sources
11 pages, 9 figures (v2: minor changes, published version)
openaire +2 more sources

