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Theoretical Computer Science, 2019
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Böhnlein, Toni +2 more
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zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Böhnlein, Toni +2 more
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Credibility in stackelberg games
Systems & Control Letters, 1984In a Stackelberg game, the leader can form incentives and raise threats upon followers to improve his own performance. The issue of credibility concerns whether the followers believe or not in the incentives and threats declared by the leader. In this paper, credibility is studied for two-person, single-stage games.
Luh, Peter B. +2 more
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On the Stackelberg knapsack game
European Journal of Operational Research, 2021zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Pferschy U. +3 more
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2021
In this chapter, we give an introduction to several game-theoretic solution concepts that will be used in this book. The chapter starts by introducing matrix-form strategic games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. We then present extensive-form games and the concept of information sets. Stackelberg games are an important type of extensive-form games.
Jeffrey Pawlick, Quanyan Zhu
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In this chapter, we give an introduction to several game-theoretic solution concepts that will be used in this book. The chapter starts by introducing matrix-form strategic games and the concept of Nash equilibrium. We then present extensive-form games and the concept of information sets. Stackelberg games are an important type of extensive-form games.
Jeffrey Pawlick, Quanyan Zhu
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2018
Stackelberg games feature strategic interactions among rational agents in markets on which some hierarchical competition takes place. In this chapter we present three prototypes of deterministic noncooperative Stackelberg games with increasing level of generality. The first is the basic duopoly game. The second is the oligopoly multiple leader-follower
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Stackelberg games feature strategic interactions among rational agents in markets on which some hierarchical competition takes place. In this chapter we present three prototypes of deterministic noncooperative Stackelberg games with increasing level of generality. The first is the basic duopoly game. The second is the oligopoly multiple leader-follower
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Cournot–Stackelberg games in competitive delocation
Annals of Operations Research, 2016zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Diego Ruiz-Hernández +2 more
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Stochastic Stackelberg Security Games
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019In this paper, we consider a discrete time stochastic Stackelberg game where there is a defender (also called leader) who has to defend a target and an attacker (also called follower). The attacker has a private type that evolves as a controlled Markov process.
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Stackelberg Strategies for Atomic Congestion Games
Theory of Computing Systems, 2007zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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On Dynamic, Deterministic, Stackelberg Games
1982 American Control Conference, 1982By using a simple example, this paper illustrates a new process for solving general multi-stage Stackelberg games. This gives a distinct picture of the problem, and many peculiar phenomena reveal themselves. In particular, new perspectives of the principle of optimality are discussed.
Peter B. Luth +2 more
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