Results 101 to 110 of about 2,218,614 (254)
A Q‐Learning Algorithm to Solve the Two‐Player Zero‐Sum Game Problem for Nonlinear Systems
International Journal of Adaptive Control and Signal Processing, Volume 39, Issue 3, Page 566-581, March 2025.A Q‐learning algorithm to solve the two‐player zero‐sum game problem for nonlinear systems. ABSTRACT This paper deals with the two‐player zero‐sum game problem, which is a bounded L2$$ {L}_2 $$‐gain robust control problem. Finding an analytical solution to the complex Hamilton‐Jacobi‐Issacs (HJI) equation is a challenging task.
Afreen Islam +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Secure Implementation:Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Reconsidered [PDF]
Strategy-proofness, requiring that truth-telling is a dominant strategy, is a standard concept in social choice theory. However, the concept of strategy-proofness has serious drawbacks. First, announcing one's true preference may not be a unique dominant
Tomas Sjostrom +2 more
core +3 more sources
Protocol for high-throughput single-cell patterning using a reusable ultrathin metal microstencil. [PDF]
STAR Protoc, 2023 Tian Q +6 more
europepmc +1 more source
Strategy-proof preference aggregation [PDF]
, 2012 An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategyproof if misreporting one’s preference never produces a social ordering that is strictly between the original ordering and one’s own preference.
Walter Bossert, Yves Sprumont
openaire +1 more source
International Journal of Adaptive Control and Signal Processing, EarlyView.This article proposes a convergent adaptive observer for a damped wave PDE and an infinite‐dimensional ODE coupled in cascade using sampled‐in‐space ODE state measurements. The proposed observer estimates the distributed states of the PDE and ODE along with unknown PDE parameters and spatial input.
Zehor Belkhatir +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Individual versus group strategy-proofness : when do they coincide? [PDF]
, 2009 A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive
Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica +4 more
core +2 more sources
Breaking the traditional: a survey of algorithmic mechanism design applied to economic and complex environments. [PDF]
Neural Comput Appl, 2023 Chen Q +6 more
europepmc +1 more source
Observer‐Based Adaptive Event‐Triggered Tracking Control for Fuzzy TS Systems With Premise Mismatch
International Journal of Adaptive Control and Signal Processing, EarlyView.This paper presents an adaptive logistic event‐triggered observer‐based tracking controller for Takagi‐Sugeno fuzzy systems under constrained inputs and network delays. Leveraging a hybrid LMI and Secretary Bird Optimization approach, this strategy significantly minimizes communication overhead and computational burden while ensuring optimal reference ...
Oussama Djadane +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods [PDF]
In this paper we are interested in efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by regrouping goods in her initial endowment. We present a suitable
Claus-Jochen Haake, Dinko Dimitrov
core
Advanced Engineering Materials, EarlyView.In this review, the current state of light‐assisted 3D printing as it pertains to engineering musculoskeletal tissues including bone, cartilage, skeletal muscle, tendon, and ligaments is summarized. Common printing techniques, photoreactive materials, and study design choices are compiled and reviewed.
Meagan Morgan, Bin Zhang, Roger Narayan
wiley +1 more source