Results 111 to 120 of about 2,218,614 (254)
In this paper we consider the standard voting model with a finite set of alternatives A and n voters and address the following question : what are the characteristics of domains D that induce the property that every strategy-proof social choice function ...
Arunava Sen, Shurojit Chatterji
core +1 more source
A field evaluation of a matching mechanism: University applicant behavior in Australia. [PDF]
PNAS Nexus, 2022 Guillen P +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Soft Mechanical‐Electrical Logic Using Liquid Metal‐Filled 3D‐Printed Architectures
Advanced Engineering Materials, EarlyView.We present 3D‐printed soft mechanical–electrical logic elements that use liquid metal–filled silicone tubes actuated by thermoplastic polyurethane/polylactic acid (TPU/PLA) architectures to produce Boolean operations. Complementary normally open and normally closed unit cells perform repeatable binary transitions and can be combined into more complex ...
Christoph Lehmann +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Bribe-proof Rules in the Division Problem [PDF]
The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated.
Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es +1 more
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In Situ Micromechanical Study of Bimodal γ′–γ″ Precipitate Assemblies in Ni–Cr–Al–Nb Superalloy
Advanced Engineering Materials, EarlyView.A Ni–Cr–Al–Nb superalloy with a bimodal γ′–γ″ precipitate distribution is developed. Composite precipitate assemblies form through heterogeneous nucleation, effectively impeding dislocation motion. Micropillar compression reveals high strength at room and elevated temperatures, governed by precipitate shearing, with coupled faulting mechanisms ...
Ujjval Bansal +4 more
wiley +1 more source
Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule [PDF]
This paper studies the strategic foundations of the Representative Voter Theorem (Rothstein, 1991), also called the "second version" of the Median Voter Theorem. As a by-product, it also considers the existence of non-trivial strategy-proof social choice
Alejandro Saporiti, Fernando Tohmé
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A unique maximal domain for strategy-proofness without pareto efficiency [PDF]
, 2009 Ching and Serizawa (1998) showed that the single-plateaued domain is the unique maximal domain for strategy-proofness, symmetry,and efficiency, but pointed out that strategy-proofness becomes redundant when symmetry is strengthened to strong symmetry ...
Ching, S
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Strategy-proofness and single-peakedness [PDF]
Public Choice, 1976 Jean-Marie Blin, Mark Satterthwaite
openaire +2 more sources
Advanced Engineering Materials, EarlyView.A combined experimental–computational framework identifies energy‐dependent laser absorptivity for NiTi in laser powder‐bed fusion, applicable to conduction and transition modes. Single‐track experiments and thermofluid smoothed particle hydrodynamics simulations are coupled through inverse analysis of melt pool geometry.
Mohamadreza Afrasiabi +3 more
wiley +1 more source
STRATEGY-PROOF MECHANISMS WITH PRIVATE AND PUBLIC GOODS [PDF]
In this paper we develop a differentiable approach to deal with incentives in a, possibly small, subset of a general domain of preferences in economies with one public and one private good.
José Rueda-Llano, Luis Corchón
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