Results 211 to 220 of about 66,516 (263)
Soft MatterSome of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Related searches:
Related searches:
Studia Logica, 2001
The paper under review is concerned with theories of partial truth over type-free combinatory logic. The notion of self-reflective truth considered has its roots in work by Aczel, Feferman, Fitch, Kripke, Scott and others, see \textit{A. Cantini} [Logical frameworks for truth and abstraction. An axiomatic study, North Holland, Amsterdam (1996; Zbl 0860.
openaire +2 more sources
The paper under review is concerned with theories of partial truth over type-free combinatory logic. The notion of self-reflective truth considered has its roots in work by Aczel, Feferman, Fitch, Kripke, Scott and others, see \textit{A. Cantini} [Logical frameworks for truth and abstraction. An axiomatic study, North Holland, Amsterdam (1996; Zbl 0860.
openaire +2 more sources
CONSISTENCY AND THE THEORY OF TRUTH
The Review of Symbolic Logic, 2015AbstractWhat is the logical strength of theories of truth? That is: If you take a theory${\cal T}$and add a theory of truth to it, how strong is the resulting theory, as compared to${\cal T}$? Once the question has been properly formulated, the answer turns out to be about as elegant as one could want: At least when${\cal T}$is finitely axiomatized ...
openaire +1 more source
2019
This chapter lays out the principal features of Bergson’s new conception of truth. Although not always foregrounded by Bergson (and consequently overlooked by commentators), the issue of truth is central for him. Like William James, Bergson rejects the correspondence theory of truth because the world we seek to describe is endlessly changing ...
Arnaud François, Nils F. Schott
openaire +2 more sources
This chapter lays out the principal features of Bergson’s new conception of truth. Although not always foregrounded by Bergson (and consequently overlooked by commentators), the issue of truth is central for him. Like William James, Bergson rejects the correspondence theory of truth because the world we seek to describe is endlessly changing ...
Arnaud François, Nils F. Schott
openaire +2 more sources
The Pragmatist Theory of Truth
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1976William James, the originator of the [pragmatist] theory [of truth], took over the central idea from C. S. Peirce (sic), but altered it in the process. Peirce had put forward practical usefulness as a criterion of meaningfulness ... James applied this idea (perhaps confusedly) to truth in the attempt to provide a down-to-earth substitute for certainty ...
openaire +2 more sources
Bilattices and the theory of truth
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1989A structure \(\) is a bilattice if i) \(\) and \(\) are both lattices; and ii) the meet and join operations of each lattice are monotone with respect to the order relation of the other lattice. Bilattices were introduced in computer science by \textit{M. L. Ginsberg} [Multi-valued logics, Proc. AAAI-86, Morgan Kaufmann, 243-247 (1986)].
openaire +1 more source
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Cognitive science has recently begun exploring how people conceptualize and reason about truth. We offer the field a framework that can guide inquiry into intuitive theories of truth, centered on three core questions: how do people judge whether statements could be true, whether statements are true, and whether to assert them as true.
Kerem, Oktar +4 more
openaire +2 more sources
Cognitive science has recently begun exploring how people conceptualize and reason about truth. We offer the field a framework that can guide inquiry into intuitive theories of truth, centered on three core questions: how do people judge whether statements could be true, whether statements are true, and whether to assert them as true.
Kerem, Oktar +4 more
openaire +2 more sources
Theories and Theories of Truth
Metaphysica, 2011Formal theories, as in logic and mathematics, are sets of sentences closed under logical consequence. Philosophical theories, like scientific theories, are often far less formal. There are many axiomatic theories of the truth predicate for certain formal languages; on analogy with these, some philosophers (most notably Paul Horwich) have proposed ...
openaire +1 more source
Notes on Formal Theories of Truth
Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 1989In the present work we investigate formal systems which are related to Kripke's theory of truth and to its subsequent extensions via four-valued logic (Woodruff, Visser). The ground language of Peano arithmetic PA is expanded by unary predicates T(rue), F(alse); the basic theory \(BT^-\) extends PA 1) by standard axioms relating T, F with standard ...
openaire +3 more sources