Results 111 to 120 of about 3,449,298 (255)
Coevolution of Third-Party Punishment and Punishment Reputation Dependency
An obstacle in explaining the evolution of cooperation through third-party punishment is the second-order free rider problem, that is, if punishing others is costly, it is adaptive for any individual not to punish. One hypothesis to resolve the issue states that third-party punishment is advantageous for the punisher, because it is evaluated as ...
Taisho Ozaki, Yasuo Ihara
openaire +1 more source
ABSTRACT Whether corporate carbon management can enhance productive efficiency is central to firms' long‐term competitiveness and determines whether carbon reduction efforts can be sustained beyond regulatory compliance. This study examines how corporate carbon risk and opportunity management affects firm productivity (measured by total factor ...
Nan Huang, Hanlu Fan, Ruoxin Zhu
wiley +1 more source
Introduction to Third Party Funding
An introduction to the conference and on general aspects of third-party funding in ...
Domenico Pauciulo
core
ABSTRACT Research on ESG controversies has expanded rapidly, but findings remain fragmented and lack a unifying perspective. This study conducts a PRISMA‐guided, framework‐based systematic review of 68 empirical articles published between 2018 and 2025 (May) to synthesize the main determinants and consequences of ESG controversies.
Cristina Alexandrina Ştefănescu +1 more
wiley +1 more source
A Welfare Interdependence Approach to Third-Party Punishment [PDF]
Third-party punishment—the targeted infliction of costs on behalf of another by an unaffected third party—has been demonstrated in several species, including humans.
Pedersen, Eric
core +3 more sources
Leading the Loop: Anchor‐Led Orchestration in Nascent Circular Ecosystems—A Qualitative Case Study
ABSTRACT The transition towards a circular economy necessitates coordinated, systemic change across value chains. Yet the role of anchor firms in initiating and orchestrating nascent circular ecosystems remains underexplored. Using an inductive, qualitative single‐case design, we analyse a German mid‐sized entrepreneurial firm, drawing on 21 interviews
Johann Felix Mader, Patrick Spieth
wiley +1 more source
Evaluation of third-party punishment depends on its type and severity
Sacrificing own resources to punish norm violators is often regarded an altruistic act, promoting cooperation and fairness within social groups. However, recent studies highlight difficulties in interpreting third-party punishment as a prosocial and ...
Olivia Seubert, Anne Böckler
doaj +1 more source
Dominance and Submission: Social Status Biases Economic Sanctions [PDF]
Social hierarchy is persistent in all almost all societies. Social norms and their enforcement are part of sustaining hierarchical systems. This paper combines social status and norm enforcement, by introducing status in a dictator game with third party ...
Ranehill, Eva, von Essen, Emma
core
Homo Æqualis: A Cross-Society Experimental Analysis of Three Bargaining Games [PDF]
Data from three bargaining games-the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game-played in 15 societies are presented. The societies range from USundergraduates to Amazonian, Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers.
Juan Camilo Cárdenas +3 more
core +2 more sources
ABSTRACT Sustainability reports (SRs) are widely criticized for vague disclosures and selective emphasis on positive outcomes, yet systematic research on two core SR challenges remains limited: materiality (whether disclosed content is relevant) and balance (whether both achievements and challenges are reported).
Mahsa Mohammadrezaei +1 more
wiley +1 more source

