Results 41 to 50 of about 36,075 (212)
“Anything Goes” in an Ultimatum Game?
I consider an underexplored possible explainer of the “surprising” results of Ultimatum Game experiments, namely, that Proposers and Recipients consider following only some of all the logically possible strategies of their Ultimatum Game.
Peter Paul Vanderschraaf
doaj +1 more source
Fairness in Risky Environments: Theory and Evidence
The relationship between risk in the environment, risk aversion and inequality aversion is not well understood. Theories of fairness have typically assumed that pie sizes are known ex-ante. Pie sizes are, however, rarely known ex ante.
Silvester Van Koten +2 more
doaj +1 more source
Dynamic modulation of inequality aversion in human interpersonal negotiations
The effect of a proposer’s facial emotions on a receiver’s likelihood to accept offers in an iterative Ultimatum Game is unknown. Here, modelling participant behaviour demonstrates that facial emotions dynamically tune participants’ inequality aversion.
Daniel A. J. Murphy +4 more
doaj +1 more source
Ultimatum Game: Regret or Fairness?
13 pages, 2 ...
L.H. Aleksanyan +2 more
openaire +2 more sources
Winston Churchill and South Africa: An Enduring, yet Debatable Connection, 1899–1955
Abstract The article traces Churchill's engagement with South Africa, from his time as a newspaper correspondent during the Anglo‐Boer War to his services in both Liberal and Conservative cabinets as well as, ultimately, his premiership. The discussion highlights three phases in this relationship.
LUVUYO WOTSHELA
wiley +1 more source
Background In the growing body of literature on economic decision making, the main focus has typically been on explaining aggregate behavior, with little interest in individual differences despite considerable between-subject variability in decision ...
Sanfey Alan G, Scheres Anouk
doaj +1 more source
Competitive diplomacy in bargaining and war
Abstract War is often viewed as a bargaining problem. However, prior to bargaining, countries can vie for leverage by expending effort on diplomacy. This article presents a dynamic model of conflict where agenda‐setting power is endogenous to pre‐bargaining diplomatic competition.
Joseph J. Ruggiero
wiley +1 more source
Does interoceptive awareness affect the ability to regulate unfair treatment by others?
In this study we aimed to investigate how awareness of bodily responses, referred to as interoceptive awareness, influences decision-making in a social interactive context. Interoceptive awareness is thought to be crucial for adequate regulation of one’s
Mascha eVan 't Wout +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Abstract When competing for resources, people appear particularly sensitive to social cues of threat, tending to submissively cede resources to more (vs. less) threatening‐looking others. This tendency appears especially pronounced among those that are physically weaker and thus more vulnerable to harm.
Valentina Proietti +5 more
wiley +1 more source
Social distance and delegation: Does anonymity matter?
Abstract In this paper, we report on two experimental studies that examine the impact of social distance on delegation and uncover the role of anonymity driving delegation in a principal‐agent setting. Study 1 shows that reducing the social distance makes principals less likely to delegate.
Michalis Drouvelis +1 more
wiley +1 more source

