Results 241 to 250 of about 945,119 (285)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
Vertical Restraints with Incomplete Information
The Journal of Industrial Economics, 1991When a firm contracts with a privately informed retailer, vertical restraints may be insufficient to eliminate distortions arising from having to induce truthful reporting. With franchise fee contracts (which are equivalent to any other "quantity forcing" contract), two distortions arise.
openaire +1 more source
Note on duopolistic vertical restraints
European Economic Review, 1997Abstract This paper reexamines a three-stage game previously applied by Gal-Or (Duopolistic vertical restraints, European Economic Review 35, 1237–1253, 1991) to model manufacturers' choice of vertical restraints with downstream exclusive dealers.
openaire +3 more sources
Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms
The Journal of Law and Economics, 1988IT is now generally recognized that there are many cases of vertical restraints that do not fit the standard "consumer free riding on special services" theory.1 For example, the widespread use of resale price maintenance in the marketing of brand name clothing cannot be explained as inducing retailers to supply services such as dressing rooms.
Klein, Benjamin, Murphy, Kevin
openaire +1 more source
Japan and the World Economy, 1989
Abstract Resale price maintenance (r.p.m), exclusive dealing stipulations, and customer restrictions are all widespread in Japan, particularly for consumer products. Analysis of specific antitrust cases demonstrated that standard economic arguments can account for vertical restraints by Japanese makers.
openaire +1 more source
Abstract Resale price maintenance (r.p.m), exclusive dealing stipulations, and customer restrictions are all widespread in Japan, particularly for consumer products. Analysis of specific antitrust cases demonstrated that standard economic arguments can account for vertical restraints by Japanese makers.
openaire +1 more source
The Nature of Vertical Restraints
The Antitrust Bulletin, 1985Total Surplus is the best metric for social welfare. It is the sum of Producer, Retailer and Consumer Surplus (See Diagrams) – not just the sum of Producer and Consumer Surplus as assumed in most economists’ models that make the false assumption that the retail sector is perfectly competitive in categories with differentiated products.There is an ...
openaire +1 more source
Duopolistic vertical restraints
European Economic Review, 1991Abstract In an industry where competition exists at the wholesale level, vertical restraints are not necessarily desirable from the standpoint of the manufacturers. When vertical restraints are employed, it is never in the form of Retail Price Maintenance, but rather in the form of Franchise Fee pricing.
openaire +1 more source
On Vertical Restraints and the Law: A Reply
The RAND Journal of Economics, 1988* In our 1984 article we characterize the vertical restraint contracts that harmonize the interests of downstream, monopolistically competitive retailers with those of an upstream producer. The potential list of restrictions includes resale price maintenance, quantity forcing, territorial protection, and fixed franchise fees.
Frank Mathewson, Ralph A. Winter
openaire +1 more source
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2007
Over the past fifty years anti-trust theorists and economists have advanced several pro-competitive explanations for minimum resale price maintenance, or rpm. In addition, scholars have argued that non-price vertical restraints (such as territorial exclusivity) and rpm have similar effects on price and quantity and should therefore be treated ...
openaire +1 more source
Over the past fifty years anti-trust theorists and economists have advanced several pro-competitive explanations for minimum resale price maintenance, or rpm. In addition, scholars have argued that non-price vertical restraints (such as territorial exclusivity) and rpm have similar effects on price and quantity and should therefore be treated ...
openaire +1 more source