Results 51 to 60 of about 278 (206)

Unbalanced power relationship in digital markets between platforms and their complementors: can consumers come to the rescue?

open access: yesMarket and Competition Law Review, 2023
Acknowledging the unbalanced power relationship between online platforms and their complementors, the economic dependence relationship and fear of retaliation may prevent complementors from fighting against economically harmful practices implemented by ...
Jeanne Mouton
doaj   +1 more source

What if Adam Smith Debated an AI Economist: A Thought Experiment on Markets, Ethics, and the Invisible Hand

open access: yesBusiness Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Can AI‐driven capitalism sustain the moral preconditions of market order? We stage a dialogue between Adam Smith and a steel‐manned “EconAI” to test four Moral‐Market‐Fitness criteria: trustworthiness, fairness, non‐domination, and contestability, across 11 dilemmas.
Alexandra‐Codruța Bîzoi   +1 more
wiley   +1 more source

The Overcharge as a Measure for Antitrust Damages

open access: yesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2009
Victims of antitrust violations can recover damages in court. Yet, the quantification of antitrust damages and to whom they accrue is often complex. An illegal price increase somewhere in the chain of production percolates through to the other layers in a ripple of partial pass-ons. The resulting reductions in sales and input demands lead to additional
Han, M.A., Schinkel, M.P., Tuinstra, J.
openaire   +2 more sources

Asymmetric sanctions and corruption: Theory and practice in China

open access: yesEconomic Inquiry, EarlyView.
Abstract Asymmetric punishment of partners in crime, intended to incentivize whistle‐blowing, may increase detection and deterrence. The idea is age‐old but its use against corruption is not frequent. We study a 1997 Chinese reform that strengthened such asymmetries for some forms of bribery.
Maria Perrotta Berlin   +3 more
wiley   +1 more source

Rebating Antitrust Fines to Encourage Private Damages Actions

open access: yes, 2020
To encourage private actions for damages in antitrust cases some jurisdictions subtract a fraction of the redress from the fine. We analyze the effectiveness of this policy. Such a rebate does not encourage settlement negotiations that would otherwise not occur.
Emons, Winand, Lenhard, Severin
openaire   +3 more sources

Competition Law and Public Interest: A Challenge for Adjudication

open access: yesEuropean Law Journal, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This paper engages with the increasing concern that competition law can no longer concentrate exclusively on a narrow focus on price increases and output diminution. Within the context of growing global inequality and the exponential increase in economic power in the hands of a few, there is a need to develop a coherent jurisprudence capable ...
Dennis M. Davis
wiley   +1 more source

Disclosure of Documents in Private Antitrust Enforcement Litigation [PDF]

open access: yesYearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 2015
Procedural tools aimed at access to information in general, and disclosure of documents in particular, are crucial for the effectiveness of private antitrust enforcement litigation and for facilitating more genuine equality of arms.
Aleš Galič
doaj   +1 more source

A Primer on Antitrust Damages

open access: yesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2011
This paper considers the theory of antitrust damages and then discusses some simple models for proving them. Antitrust damages theory begins with the premise that many practices alleged to violate the antitrust laws cause no consumer harm. Others are inefficient and have few socially redeeming virtues.
openaire   +2 more sources

JOM Forum: Theory Testing Is Theory Generation

open access: yes
Journal of Operations Management, EarlyView.
Mikko Ketokivi   +6 more
wiley   +1 more source

Corporate Lobbying as Anticompetitive Behaviour in the EU

open access: yesEuropean Law Journal, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Despite the influence of ordoliberalism in EU law, the mutual feedback between market power and political influence of dominant corporations has not become an explicit consideration in competition law enforcement and has remained rather in the background as an implicit rationale. If the threats to competition posed by regulatory capture are to
Francisco E. Beneke Avila
wiley   +1 more source

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