Results 21 to 30 of about 5,203 (262)

Bayesian Causality [PDF]

open access: yesThe American Statistician, 2019
Although no universally accepted definition of causality exists, in practice one is often faced with the question of statistically assessing causal relationships in different settings. We present a uniform general approach to causality problems derived from the axiomatic foundations of the Bayesian statistical framework.
Pierre Baldi, Babak Shahbaba
openaire   +4 more sources

Free Will: A consensus gentium Argument [PDF]

open access: yesOrganon F
This argument for free will is a probabilistic one based upon two conjectures: first, that of consensus; namely, that a large majority of people believe that they and others have free will and second, that a priori proofs against the existence of free ...
William Hunt
doaj   +1 more source

Bayesian renormalization

open access: yesMachine Learning: Science and Technology, 2023
Abstract In this note we present a fully information theoretic approach to renormalization inspired by Bayesian statistical inference, which we refer to as Bayesian renormalization. The main insight of Bayesian renormalization is that the Fisher metric defines a correlation length that plays the role of an emergent renormalization group (
David S Berman   +2 more
openaire   +4 more sources

The Problem of New Evidence: P-Hacking and Pre-Analysis Plans

open access: yesDiametros, 2020
We provide a novel articulation of the epistemic peril of p-hacking using three resources from philosophy: predictivism, Bayesian confirmation theory, and model selection theory.
Zoe Hitzig, Jacob Stegenga
doaj   +1 more source

The heuristic conception of inference to the best explanation [PDF]

open access: yes, 2017
An influential suggestion about the relationship between Bayesianism and inference to the best explanation holds that IBE functions as a heuristic to approximate Bayesian reasoning.
Dellsén, Finnur
core   +3 more sources

Justifying Objective Bayesianism on Predicate Languages

open access: yesEntropy, 2015
Objective Bayesianism says that the strengths of one’s beliefs ought to be probabilities, calibrated to physical probabilities insofar as one has evidence of them, and otherwise sufficiently equivocal. These norms of belief are often explicated using the
Jürgen Landes, Jon Williamson
doaj   +1 more source

Objective Bayesianism and the Maximum Entropy Principle

open access: yesEntropy, 2013
Objective Bayesian epistemology invokes three norms: the strengths of our beliefs should be probabilities; they should be calibrated to our evidence of physical probabilities; and they should otherwise equivocate sufficiently between the basic ...
Jon Williamson, Jürgen Landes
doaj   +1 more source

DELIBERATION, JUDGEMENT AND THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE [PDF]

open access: yes, 2014
A normative Bayesian theory of deliberation and judgement requires a procedure for merging the evidence of a collection of agents. In order to provide such a procedure, one needs to ask what the evidence is that grounds Bayesian probabilities.
Dawid   +13 more
core   +3 more sources

Bayesianism for Non-ideal Agents [PDF]

open access: yes, 2020
Orthodox Bayesianism is a highly idealized theory of how we ought to live our epistemic lives. One of the most widely discussed idealizations is that of logical omniscience: the assumption that an agent’s degrees of belief must be probabilistically ...
Bjerring, Jens Christian   +1 more
core  

Coherent frequentism [PDF]

open access: yes, 2009
By representing the range of fair betting odds according to a pair of confidence set estimators, dual probability measures on parameter space called frequentist posteriors secure the coherence of subjective inference without any prior distribution.
Datta G. S.   +16 more
core   +1 more source

Home - About - Disclaimer - Privacy