Results 91 to 100 of about 595 (210)
An impossibility theorem in game dynamics. [PDF]
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 2023 Milionis J +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Learning in perturbed asymmetric games
, 2004 We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero ...
Hopkins, E +5 more
core
An algorithm for payoff space in C1-games
Atti della Accademia Peloritana dei Pericolanti : Classe di Scienze Fisiche, Matematiche e Naturali, 2010 In this paper we present an algorithm implemented by MATLAB, and several examples completely realized by this algorithm, based on a method developed by one of the authors to determine the payoff-space of certain normal-form C1-games.
David Carfì, Angela Ricciardello
doaj +1 more source
Constant rank bimatrix games are PPAD-hard [PDF]
Proceedings of the forty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, 2014 The rank of a bimatrix game (A,B) is defined as rank(A+B). Computing a Nash equilibrium (NE) of a rank-$0$, i.e., zero-sum game is equivalent to linear programming (von Neumann'28, Dantzig'51). In 2005, Kannan and Theobald gave an FPTAS for constant rank games, and asked if there exists a polynomial time algorithm to compute an exact NE.
openaire +2 more sources
Completely Mixed Strategies for Generalized Bimatrix and Switching Controller Stochastic Game
, 2017 In this paper, we revisit a result by Jurg et al. (Linear Algebra Appl 141:61–74, 1990) where the necessary and sufficient condition for a bimatrix game to be weakly completely mixed is given.
Neogy, S. K. +2 more
core +1 more source
Joint Probabilities Approach to Quantum Games with Noise. [PDF]
Entropy (Basel), 2023 Legón AR, Medina E.
europepmc +1 more source
Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underly- ing thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked.
Borm, P.E.M. +2 more
core
Dilemma breaking in quantum games by joint probabilities approach. [PDF]
Sci Rep, 2022 Legón AR, Medina E.
europepmc +1 more source
, 2020 In the paper, constructions of the generalized method of characteristics are applied for calculating the generalized minimax (viscosity) solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi equations in dynamic bimatrix games.
Tarasyev, Alexander M. +1 more
core
Efficiency of Classical and Quantum Games Equilibria. [PDF]
Entropy (Basel), 2021 Szopa M.
europepmc +1 more source