Results 111 to 120 of about 595 (210)
A simplicial algorithm approach to Nash equilibria in concave games [PDF]
In this paper we demonstrate a new method for computing approximate Nash equilibria in n-person games. Strategy spaces are assumed to be represented by simplices, while payoff functions are assumed to be concave.
Claus-Jochen Haake, Francis Edward Su
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On the Number of Nash Equilibria in a Bimatrix Game [PDF]
We show that if y is an odd integer between 1 and 2^{n} - 1, there is an n x n bimatrix game with exactly y Nash equilibria (NE).
Thomas Quint, Martin Shubik
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Social Dilemmas in Nature-Based Tourism Depend on Social Value Orientations. [PDF]
Sci Rep, 2020 Honjo K, Kubo T.
europepmc +1 more source
The role of evolutionary game theory in spatial and non-spatial models of the survival of cooperation in cancer: a review. [PDF]
J R Soc Interface, 2022 Coggan H, Page KM.
europepmc +1 more source
Complexity of finding Nash equilibria in 0-1 bimatrix games
, 2005 We exhibit a polynomial reduction from the problem of finding a Nashequilibrium of a bimatrix game with rational coefficients to the problemof finding a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game with 0-1 ...
Kane, Daniel, Abbott, Tim, Valiant, Paul
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Entangled equilibria for bimatrix games
This paper proposes a new refinement of Nash equilibria. Where most existing refinements are based on a thought experiment which imposes a certain ‘imperfection’ on the choices of individual players, we consider a thought experiment in which the imperfections occur on a global, ‘system’ level. If an imperfection occurs, the actions as prescribed by the
van Beek, Andries, Borm, Peter
openaire +2 more sources
Homotopy Methods to Compute Equilibria in Game Theory
This paper presents a complete survey of the use of homotopy methods in game theory.Homotopies allow for a robust computation of game-theoretic equilibria and their refinements.
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques +1 more
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Irreversible Capital Investment in a Two-Stage Bimatrix Fishery Game Model
A two-stage, two-player noncooperative game model is developed(under an irreversible capital investment assumption) with the main aim of predicting the number of vessels that each player in such a game will find in his best interest to employ in the ...
Sumaila, Ussif Rashid
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Continuity and Equilibrium Stability [PDF]
This paper discusses the problem of stability of equilibrium points in normal form games in the tremling-hand framework. An equilibrium point is called perffect if it is stable against at least one seqence of trembles approaching zero. A strictly perfect
C. D. Aliprantis, I. Topolyan
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Semi-Infinite Assignment Problems and Related Games
In 1972 Shapley and Shubik introduced assignment games associated to finite assignment problems in which two types of agents were involved and they proved that these games have a non-empty core. In this paper we look at the situation where the set of one
Tijs, S.H., Timmer, J.B., Llorca, N.
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