Results 111 to 120 of about 875,430 (205)
Learning in Perturbed Asymmetric Games [PDF]
We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero ...
Ed Hopkins, Josef Hofbauer
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Irreversible Capital Investment in a Two-Stage Bimatrix Fishery Game Model [PDF]
A two-stage, two-player noncooperative game model is developed(under an irreversible capital investment assumption) with the main aim of predicting the number of vessels that each player in such a game will find in his best interest to employ in the ...
Sumaila, Ussif Rashid
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Social Dilemmas in Nature-Based Tourism Depend on Social Value Orientations. [PDF]
Sci Rep, 2020 Honjo K, Kubo T.
europepmc +1 more source
The role of evolutionary game theory in spatial and non-spatial models of the survival of cooperation in cancer: a review. [PDF]
J R Soc Interface, 2022 Coggan H, Page KM.
europepmc +1 more source
Semi-Infinite Assignment Problems and Related Games [PDF]
In 1972 Shapley and Shubik introduced assignment games associated to finite assignment problems in which two types of agents were involved and they proved that these games have a non-empty core. In this paper we look at the situation where the set of one
Tijs, S.H., Timmer, J.B., Llorca, N.
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A simplicial algorithm approach to Nash equilibria in concave games [PDF]
In this paper we demonstrate a new method for computing approximate Nash equilibria in n-person games. Strategy spaces are assumed to be represented by simplices, while payoff functions are assumed to be concave.
Claus-Jochen Haake, Francis Edward Su
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Complexity of finding Nash equilibria in 0-1 bimatrix games
, 2005 We exhibit a polynomial reduction from the problem of finding a Nashequilibrium of a bimatrix game with rational coefficients to the problemof finding a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game with 0-1 ...
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, 2020 In the paper, constructions of the generalized method of characteristics are applied for calculating the generalized minimax (viscosity) solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi equations in dynamic bimatrix games.
Tarasyev, Alexander M. +1 more
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Quantum Negotiation Games: Toward Ethical Equilibria. [PDF]
Entropy (Basel)Smoliński R +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
Continuity and Equilibrium Stability [PDF]
This paper discusses the problem of stability of equilibrium points in normal form games in the tremling-hand framework. An equilibrium point is called perffect if it is stable against at least one seqence of trembles approaching zero. A strictly perfect
C. D. Aliprantis, I. Topolyan
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