Generic finiteness of equilibrium payoffs for bimatrix games [PDF]
It is shown that in any affine space of payoff matrices the equilibrium payoffs of bimatrix games are generically finite.Bimatrix Games, Generic ...
Andreu Mas-Colell
core
Quantum Negotiation Games: Toward Ethical Equilibria. [PDF]
Entropy (Basel)Smoliński R +3 more
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Nash Equilibria in Four-Strategy Quantum Extensions of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. [PDF]
Entropy (Basel)Frąckiewicz P +4 more
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Game-Theoretic Motion Planning with Perception Uncertainty and Right-of-Way Constraints. [PDF]
Sensors (Basel)Panahandeh P +4 more
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Correction: Defending Against Advanced Persistent Threats Using Game-Theory. [PDF]
PLoS OneRass S, König S, Schauer S.
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Love, culture, rationality, and learning in repeated games. [PDF]
Front SociolCendales A +2 more
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Bounding Rationality by Discounting Time [PDF]
Consider a game where Alice generates an integer and Bob wins if he can factor that integer. Traditional game theory tells us that Bob will always win this game even though in practice Alice will win given our usual assumptions about the hardness of ...
Rahul Santhanam, Lance Fortnow
core
An Attacker-Defender Game Model with Constrained Strategies. [PDF]
Entropy (Basel)Ren J, Liu J, Dong Y, Li Z, Li W.
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Exponentially many steps for finding a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game
, 2004 The Lemke–Howson algorithm is the classical algorithm for the problem NASH of finding one Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game. It provides a constructive, elementary proof of existence of an equilibrium, by a typical “directed parity argument”, which ...
Savani, Rahul, von Stengel, Bernhard
core
The strategy dynamics of collective systems: Underlying hindrances beyond two-actor coordination. [PDF]
PLoS OneValencia-Romero A, Grogan PT.
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