Results 31 to 40 of about 595 (210)
The method of feasible directions in problems nonlinear programming for bimatrix games [PDF]
The problem of the Nash equilibrium in bimatrix game is considered. The search for a solution is associated with a problem of nonlinear programming. Application of the method of feasible directions for the solution of such a problem is investigated.
Dariya Sergeevna Nabatova
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On the Nash equilibrium in the inspector problem
Inspector problem represents an economic duel of inspector and law violator and is formulated as a bimatrix game. In general, bimatrix game is NP-complete problem.
Martynas Sabaliauskas, Jonas Mockus
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The aim of this paper is to develop a bilinear programming method for solving bimatrix games in which the payoffs are expressed with trapezoidal intuitionistic fuzzy numbers (TrIFNs), which are called TrIFN bimatrix games for short.
Deng-Feng Li, Jie Yang
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On ‘Informationally Robust Equilibria’ for Bimatrix Games [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Reijnierse, J.H. +2 more
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Background. A problem of selecting amongst efficient Nash equilibria is solved by refining them. The existing approaches to refining do not guarantee that the refined efficient Nash equilibrium will be single.
Vadim V. Romanuke
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Games of fixed rank: a hierarchy of bimatrix games [PDF]
We propose a new hierarchical approach to understand the complexity of the open problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game. Specifically, we investigate a hierarchy of bimatrix games $(A,B)$ which results from restricting the rank of the matrix $A+B$ to be of fixed rank at most $k$.
Ravi Kannan, Thorsten Theobald
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A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Baccara Chemin de Fer, II
In a previous paper, we considered several models of the parlor game baccara chemin de fer, including Model B2 (a 2×2484 matrix game) and Model B3 (a 25×2484 matrix game), both of which depend on a positive-integer parameter d, the number of decks.
Stewart N. Ethier, Jiyeon Lee
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The empirical implications of rank in Bimatrix games [PDF]
We study the structural complexity of bimatrix games, formalized via rank, from an empirical perspective. We consider a setting where we have data on player behavior in diverse strategic situations, but where we do not observe the relevant payoff functions.
Siddharth Barman +3 more
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Credibilistic Loss Aversion Nash Equilibrium for Bimatrix Games with Triangular Fuzzy Payoffs
Inspired by Shalev’s model of loss aversion, we investigate the effect of loss aversion on a bimatrix game where the payoffs in the bimatrix game are characterized by triangular fuzzy variables.
Chunsheng Cui +2 more
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On perfectness concepts for bimatrix games [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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