Results 51 to 60 of about 595 (210)
A note on bimatrix game maximal Selten subsets [PDF]
: In this paper, we implement automatic procedures to enumerate all Nash maximal subsets of a bimatrix game and compute their dimensions. We propose a linear programming approach to identify extreme perfect Nash equilibria, enumerate all Selten maximal ...
Pierre Hansen +5 more
core +1 more source
A game theoretic approach to wireless body area networks interference control
Abstract In this paper we consider a scenario where there are two wireless body area networks (WBANs) interfere with each other from a game theoretic perspective. In particular, we envision two WBANs playing a potential game to enhance their performance by decreasing interference to each other.
Ahmed A. Alabdel Abass +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Background. Multiple Nash equilibria bring a new problem of selecting amongst them but this problem is solved by refining the equilibria. However, none of the existing refinements can guarantee a single refined Nash equilibrium.
Vadim V. Romanuke
doaj +1 more source
Social Interaction‐Aware Dynamical Models and Decision‐Making for Autonomous Vehicles
Interaction‐aware autonomous driving (IAAD) is a growing research field, focusing on autonomous vehicles (AVs) safely interacting with human road users. Understanding and predicting human behavior is crucial. This review assesses current IAAD research, examining terminology, challenges, and existing models for human road user interaction.
Luca Crosato +5 more
wiley +1 more source
Cyclic Competition and Percolation in Grouping Predator-Prey Populations
We study, within the framework of game theory, the properties of a spatially distributed population of both predators and preys that may hunt or defend themselves either isolatedly or in group. Specifically, we show that the properties of the spatial Lett-
Alessandra F. Lütz +2 more
doaj +1 more source
A generalized Hotelling–Downs model with asymmetric candidates
Abstract We investigate an extension of the Hotelling–Downs model to the case where the preferences of the voters do not have to be single peaked. In the case where candidates only care about winning or losing, assuming that a voter elects each candidate symmetrically with equal probability when indifferent, previous works by Fisher and Ryan and by ...
Elham Nikram, Dieter Balkenborg
wiley +1 more source
Eco-evolutionary dynamics of bimatrix games
Feedbacks between strategies and the environment are common in social-ecological, evolutionary ecological and even psychological-economic systems. Using common resources is always a dilemma for community members, like the tragedy of the commons. Here, we consider replicator dynamics with feedback-evolving games, where the pay-offs switch between two ...
Longmei Shu, Feng Fu
openaire +2 more sources
On the generic finiteness of outcome distributions for bimatrix game forms [PDF]
We provide an example of an outcome game form with two players for which there is in an open set of utilities for both players such that, in each of the associated games, the set of Nash equilibria induce a continuum of outcome distributions.
Litan, Cristian M. +3 more
core
A Two‐Step Matrix‐Splitting Iterative Method for Solving the Generalized Absolute Value Equation
In this paper, we present a two‐step Newton‐based matrix‐splitting iteration method for solving the generalize absolute value equation. This method can produce a number of two‐step Newton‐based relaxation iteration algorithms with the right matrix‐splitting options.
Lin Zheng, Yangxin Tang, Luigi Rarità
wiley +1 more source
On Altruism and Spite in Bimatrix Games
One common assumption in game theory is that any player optimizes a utility function that takes into account only its own payoff. However, it has long been observed that in real life players may adopt an altruistic or even spiteful behaviour. As such, there are numerous attempts in the economics literature that strive to explain the fact that players ...
Michail Fasoulakis +3 more
openaire +2 more sources

