Results 61 to 70 of about 875,430 (205)
A game theoretic approach to wireless body area networks interference control
IET Wireless Sensor Systems, Volume 14, Issue 3, Page 72-83, June 2024.Abstract In this paper we consider a scenario where there are two wireless body area networks (WBANs) interfere with each other from a game theoretic perspective. In particular, we envision two WBANs playing a potential game to enhance their performance by decreasing interference to each other.
Ahmed A. Alabdel Abass +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Наукові вісті Національного технічного університету України "Київський політехнічний інститут", 2018 Background. Multiple Nash equilibria bring a new problem of selecting amongst them but this problem is solved by refining the equilibria. However, none of the existing refinements can guarantee a single refined Nash equilibrium.
Vadim V. Romanuke
doaj +1 more source
Social Interaction‐Aware Dynamical Models and Decision‐Making for Autonomous Vehicles
Advanced Intelligent Systems, Volume 6, Issue 3, March 2024.Interaction‐aware autonomous driving (IAAD) is a growing research field, focusing on autonomous vehicles (AVs) safely interacting with human road users. Understanding and predicting human behavior is crucial. This review assesses current IAAD research, examining terminology, challenges, and existing models for human road user interaction.
Luca Crosato +5 more
wiley +1 more source
Cyclic Competition and Percolation in Grouping Predator-Prey Populations
Games, 2017 We study, within the framework of game theory, the properties of a spatially distributed population of both predators and preys that may hunt or defend themselves either isolatedly or in group. Specifically, we show that the properties of the spatial Lett-
Alessandra F. Lütz +2 more
doaj +1 more source
A generalized Hotelling–Downs model with asymmetric candidates
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Volume 26, Issue 1, February 2024.Abstract We investigate an extension of the Hotelling–Downs model to the case where the preferences of the voters do not have to be single peaked. In the case where candidates only care about winning or losing, assuming that a voter elects each candidate symmetrically with equal probability when indifferent, previous works by Fisher and Ryan and by ...
Elham Nikram, Dieter Balkenborg
wiley +1 more source
Entropy Optimization Model on Bimatrix Game [PDF]
, 2011 181-192This paper presents an entropy optimization model on bimatrix game (two-person non-zero-sum game). According to the Maximum Entropy Principle the entropy function of the players of bimatrix game has been considered as an objective and using it we ...
Roy, Sankar Kumar, Das, Chandan Bikash
core +1 more source
GRAPHICAL METHOD FOR INTERVAL BIMATRIX GAMES [PDF]
International Journal of Pure and Apllied Mathematics, 2016 This paper deals with two-person non-zero sum games with interval payoffs. Graphical method to find a mixed strategy equilibrium is adapted to interval bimatrix games. In addition, interval bimatrix games Nash equilibrium is attained by graphical method. Nu- merical examples are also illustrated.
OR, AYKUT +2 more
openaire +2 more sources
A Two‐Step Matrix‐Splitting Iterative Method for Solving the Generalized Absolute Value Equation
Journal of Mathematics, Volume 2024, Issue 1, 2024.In this paper, we present a two‐step Newton‐based matrix‐splitting iteration method for solving the generalize absolute value equation. This method can produce a number of two‐step Newton‐based relaxation iteration algorithms with the right matrix‐splitting options.
Lin Zheng, Yangxin Tang, Luigi Rarità
wiley +1 more source
Generic finiteness of equilibrium distributions for bimatrix outcome game forms [PDF]
, 2020 We provide sufficient and necessary conditions for the generic finiteness of the number of distributions on outcomes, induced by the completely mixed Nash equilibria associated to a bimatrix outcome game form.
Marhuenda, Francisco +2 more
core +1 more source
On the computation of stable sets for bimatrix games [PDF]
In this paper it is shown how to compute stable sets, defined by Mertens (1989), inthe context of bimatrix games only using linear optimization techniques.combinatorics;
Vermeulen,Dries, Jansen,Mathijs
core +2 more sources