Results 91 to 100 of about 757 (200)
Imitation Games and Computation [PDF]
TAn imitation game is a finite two person normal form game in which the two players have the same set of pure strategies and the goal of the second player is to choose the same pure strategy as the first player. Gale et al.
Andrew McLennan, Rabee Tourky
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To improve the network interaction step-wise process, a genetic algorithm is suggested for finding more stable solutions in bimatrix games. The algorithm is based on using an approach of successive approximation to an equilibrium situation within a ...
Romanuke Vadim
doaj +1 more source
Dilemma breaking in quantum games by joint probabilities approach. [PDF]
Legón AR, Medina E.
europepmc +1 more source
On the generic finiteness of outcome distributions for bimatrix game forms [PDF]
We provide an example of an outcome game form with two players for which there is in an open set of utilities for both players such that, in each of the associated games, the set of Nash equilibria induce a continuum of outcome distributions.
Nicolai S. Kukushkin +2 more
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Informationally Robust Equlibria
Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games.Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that ...
Borm, P.E.M. +2 more
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Efficiency of Classical and Quantum Games Equilibria. [PDF]
Szopa M.
europepmc +1 more source
Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underly- ing thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked.
Borm, P.E.M. +2 more
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The evolution and social cost of herding mentality promote cooperation. [PDF]
Chica M, Rand W, Santos FC.
europepmc +1 more source
On symmetric bimatrix games [PDF]
Computation of Nash equilibria of bimatrix games is studied from the viewpoint of identifying polynomially solvable cases with special attention paid to symmetric random games.
Forgó, Ferenc
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Cold play: Learning across bimatrix games [PDF]
We study one-shot play in the set of all bimatrix games by a large population of agents. The agents never see the same game twice, but they can learn ‘across games’ by developing solution concepts that tell them how to play new games.
Schenk-Hoppé, Klaus R., Lensberg, Terje
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