Results 81 to 90 of about 561,032 (197)
Informationally Robust Equlibria [PDF]
Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games.Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that ...
Borm, P.E.M. +2 more
core
Equilibrium Tracing in Bimatrix Games
, 2008 We analyze the relations of the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm, the Lemke-Howson algorithm and the global Newton method introduced by Govindan and Wilson. It is known that the global Newton method encompasses the Lemke-Howson algorithm; we prove that it also comprises the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm, and more generally, the linear tracing procedure,
openaire +4 more sources
Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underly- ing thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked.
Borm, P.E.M. +2 more
core
Coalition game-theoretic models of capital structure and their parametric analysis
Современная математика: Фундаментальные направленияThis work is a continuation of the research conducted in [2,3]. When forming the capital structure of enterprises (determining the shares of borrowed and equity funds), the balance of interests of owners and managers plays an important role. In this case,
E. M. Bogatov, E. G. Demidova
doaj +1 more source
Learning in Perturbed Asymmetric Games [PDF]
We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero ...
Ed Hopkins, Josef Hofbauer
core
A simplicial algorithm approach to Nash equilibria in concave games [PDF]
In this paper we demonstrate a new method for computing approximate Nash equilibria in n-person games. Strategy spaces are assumed to be represented by simplices, while payoff functions are assumed to be concave.
Claus-Jochen Haake, Francis Edward Su
core
Topics arising from 3x3 bimatrix games [PDF]
, 2018 This thesis is devoted to the study of bimatrix games, in particular examples of 3x3 bimatrix games governed by the Best Response Dynamics or coupled replicator equations.
Olszowiec, Cezary Mikolaj
core +1 more source
An impossibility theorem in game dynamics. [PDF]
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 2023 Milionis J +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
On the effect of risk aversion in bimatrix games [PDF]
Nash equilibria with identical supports are compared for bimatrix games that are different with respect to the risk aversion of player 2. For equilibria in 2 by 2-bimatrix games and for equilibria with efficient supports in coordination games it is ...
Berden,Caroline, Peters,Hans
core
An algorithm for payoff space in C1-games
Atti della Accademia Peloritana dei Pericolanti : Classe di Scienze Fisiche, Matematiche e Naturali, 2010 In this paper we present an algorithm implemented by MATLAB, and several examples completely realized by this algorithm, based on a method developed by one of the authors to determine the payoff-space of certain normal-form C1-games.
David Carfì, Angela Ricciardello
doaj +1 more source