WHICH CHARACTERISTICS OF PRICE-FIXING AGREEMENTS ARE RELATED TO A GREATER DAMAGE TO CONSUMERS? [PDF]
Revista de Economia Contemporânea, 2022 Despite the deterrence effect generated by antitrust laws, the fact is that many collusive agreements end up forming in the economy. An essential task is to understand how distinct market characteristics affect cartel profits and damages.
Lucas Campio Pinha
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016 SummaryThe begin and end dates of cartels are often ambiguous, despite competition authorities stating them with precision. The legally established infringement period(s) from documentary evidence need not coincide with the period(s) of actual cartel effects.
Boswijk, H.P. +2 more
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Leniency Program as an Innovative Legal Tool for Fighting Cartels within The European Union
Managerial Economics, 2012 The article focuses on discussing the substance of the institution of leniency which is used against cartel agreements. The study was carried out with regard to the provisions of EU law and Polish law.
Agnieszka Barcik, Piotr Dziwiński
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Cartel Sustainability and Cartel Stability [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2004 The paper studies how does the size of a cartel affect the possibility that its members can sustain a collusive agreement. I obtain that collusion is easier to sustain the larger the cartel is. Then, I explore the implications of this result on the incentives of firms to participate in a cartel.
openaire +3 more sources
More Than a Decade of the Slovak Settlement Regime in Antitrust Matters: From European Inspirations to National Inventions [PDF]
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 2023 The settlement procedure in Slovakia stems from three sources of inspiration: top-to-bottom (European Union law), bottom-up (incentive of an undertaking’s lawyer) and horizontal sources (Czechia).
Ondrej Blažo
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Cutting the Flow: Argentina as a Success Case against Drug Trafficking 2016–2019
Journal of Illicit Economies and Development, 2020 Three Latin American countries centralise cocaine production in the world: Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. However, the leading consumer markets are the United States and Europe.
Martin Verrier
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Collecting Evidence Through Access to Competition Authorities’ Files – Interplay or Potential Conflicts Between Private and Public Enforcement Proceedings? [PDF]
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 2015 Information asymmetry between claimants seeking damages for competition law violations and the alleged infringing undertaking(s) is a key problem in the development of private antitrust enforcement because it often prevents successful actions for damages.
Anna Gulińska
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Strategic leniency: insights from game theory and empirical evidence
Vilnius University Open Series, 2020 Strategic leniency signifies potential exploits of leniency that could generate detrimental effects. Leniency could be exploited in three distinct ways: (1) used to punish cartel deviator; (2) used as a cartel exit strategy; (3) used as a way to report ...
Martynas Jablonskis
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Penalizing cartels : the case for basing penalties on price overcharge [PDF]
, 2014 In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather than on the more conventional bases of revenue or profits (illegal gains).
Yannis Katsoulacos +10 more
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Access to Documents in Antitrust Litigation – EU and Croatian Perspective [PDF]
Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies, 2015 The paper analyses access to documents in cartel-based damages cases from the EU and Croatian perspective. It considers all relevant EU and Croatian legislation and case-law primarily focusing on the expected impact of the newly enacted Damages Directive.
Vlatka Butorac Malnar
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