Results 51 to 60 of about 4,893 (198)

Scientific or naïve? Perceptions of direct and indirect realism, and why they matter

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 112, Issue 1, Page 102-129, January 2026.
Abstract Philosophical debates about the nature of perception are standardly informed by an empirical assumption about folk beliefs: They assume there is such a thing as “the” common‐sense conception of vision, and that this conception is captured by Direct Realism.
Eugen Fischer   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Dependence: A Dialectical Intervention [PDF]

open access: yes, 2020
Recently, several authors have utilized the notion of dependence to respond to the traditional argument for the incompatibility of freedom and divine foreknowledge.
Cyr, Taylor W., Law, Andrew
core  

The bayesian and the abductivist

open access: yesNoûs, Volume 59, Issue 4, Page 921-937, December 2025.
Abstract A major open question in the borderlands between epistemology and philosophy of science concerns whether Bayesian updating and abductive inference are compatible. Some philosophers—most influentially Bas van Fraassen—have argued that they are not.
Mattias Skipper, Olav Benjamin Vassend
wiley   +1 more source

The Parallel Manipulation Argument [PDF]

open access: yes, 2016
Matt King has recently argued that the manipulation argument against compatibilism does not succeed by employing a dilemma: either the argument infelicitously relies on incompatibilist sourcehood conditions, or the proponent of the argument leaves a ...
Cyr, Taylor W.
core  

The Replication Argument for Incompatibilism [PDF]

open access: yes, 2019
In this paper, I articulate an argument for incompatibilism about moral responsibility and determinism. My argument comes in the form of an extended story, modeled loosely on Peter van Inwagen’s “rollback argument” scenario.
A Mele   +20 more
core   +2 more sources

Kathryn Tanner on Divine Agency and the Problem of Providential Evil

open access: yesModern Theology, Volume 41, Issue 4, Page 625-637, October 2025.
Abstract In this article I engage with Kathryn Tanner's theological framework for understanding God's agency, focusing on the way her rules of non‐contrastive transcendence and non‐competitive immanence govern her account of God's acts of creation, providence, incarnation, and atonement.
Sameer Yadav
wiley   +1 more source

What Makes Free Will Free: The Impossibility of Predicting Genuine Creativity

open access: yesConatus - Journal of Philosophy, 2020
In this paper I argue that Mill’s ‘Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity’ regarding the human will and action cannot apply on all cases, and that the human mind has potentially the capacity to create freely a will or action that, no matter what kind of ...
Nikos Erinakis
doaj   +1 more source

The Reality of Contingency: Implications for Crisis Management

open access: yesRisk, Hazards &Crisis in Public Policy, Volume 16, Issue 3, September 2025.
ABSTRACT We live in a time of overwhelming uncertainty. Whether it is the consequences of the 2025 global trade war, the war in Ukraine, the outbreak of new pandemics, the validity of knowledge, or the possible extinction of humans as a species, the power of contingency has never been so profound.
Simon Hollis, Magnus Ekengren
wiley   +1 more source

Similarity accounts of counterfactuals: A reality check1

open access: yesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 110, Issue 3, Page 887-915, May 2025.
Abstract To an unusual extent, philosophers agree that counterfactuals have truth conditions involving the most similar possible worlds where their antecedents are true, in the style of the celebrated and path‐breaking Stalnaker/Lewis accounts. Roughly, these accounts say that the counterfactual if A were the case, C would be the case is true if and ...
Alan Hájek
wiley   +1 more source

Compatibilist's Challenges on Encountering with the Zygote Argument of Manipulation [PDF]

open access: yesJournal of Philosophical Investigations
In compatibilists believe that we cannot act freely and be morally responsible for an action in a deterministic world, while compatibilists don’t deny the possibility of free action and moral responsibility for the agent, and they believe that we can ...
Zahra Khazaei   +2 more
doaj   +1 more source

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