Results 1 to 10 of about 94,619 (177)

Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes [PDF]

open access: yesPublic Choice, 2016
The goal of this paper is to propose a comparison of four multi-winner voting rules, k-Plurality, k-Negative Plurality, k-Borda, and Bloc. These four election methods are extensions of usual scoring rules designed for electing a single winner and are compared on the basis of two criteria.
Mostapha Diss, Diss Mostapha
exaly   +8 more sources

The likelihood of a Condorcet winner in the logrolling setting [PDF]

open access: yesSocial Choice and Welfare, 2017
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
William V. Gehrlein   +2 more
semanticscholar   +11 more sources

Voting with interdependent values: The Condorcet winner

open access: yesGames and Economic Behavior, 2022
We generalize the standard, private values voting model with single-peaked preferences and incomplete information by introducing interdependent preferences. Our main results show how standard mechanisms that are outcome-equivalent and implement the Con-dorcet winner under complete information or under private values yield starkly di¤erent outcomes if ...
Alex Gershkov   +3 more
semanticscholar   +7 more sources

Condorcet Loser in 2016: Apparently Trump; Condorcet Winner: Not Clinton? [PDF]

open access: yesAmerican Politics Research, 2021
Using thermometer score data from the ANES, we show that while there may have been no clear-cut Condorcet winner among the 2016 US presidential candidates, there appears to have been a Condorcet loser: Donald Trump. Thus the surprise is that the electorate preferred not only Hillary Clinton, but also the two “minor” candidates, Gary Johnson and Jill ...
Richard F Potthoff, Michael C Munger
exaly   +3 more sources

Radial Symmetry Does Not Preclude Condorcet Cycles If Different Voters Weight the Issues Differently

open access: yesEconomies, 2022
Radial symmetry, by our definition, is a precise condition on continuous ideal-point distributions, rarely if ever found exactly in practice, that is similar to the classical 1967 symmetry condition of Plott but pertains to an infinite electorate; the ...
Richard F Potthoff, Potthoff Richard F
exaly   +4 more sources

Generating random weak orders and the probability of a Condorcet winner [PDF]

open access: yesSocial Choice and Welfare, 2002
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Hans Maassen
exaly   +6 more sources

Mutations in bacterial genes induce unanticipated changes in the relationship between bacterial pathogens in experimental otitis media [PDF]

open access: yesRoyal Society Open Science, 2018
Otitis media (OM) is a common polymicrobial infection of the middle ear in children under the age of 15 years. A widely used experimental strategy to analyse roles of specific phenotypes of bacterial pathogens of OM is to study changes in co-infection ...
Vinal Lakhani   +5 more
doaj   +2 more sources

The Sampling Complexity of Condorcet Winner Identification in Dueling Bandits

open access: yesCoRR
We study best-arm identification in stochastic dueling bandits under the sole assumption that a Condorcet winner exists, i.e., an arm that wins each noisy pairwise comparison with probability at least $1/2$. We introduce a new identification procedure that exploits the full gap matrix $Δ_{i,j}=q_{i,j}-\tfrac12$ (where $q_{i,j}$ is the probability that ...
El Mehdi Saad   +2 more
openaire   +3 more sources

Probability of a Condorcet Winner for Large Electorates: An Analytic Combinatorics Approach

open access: yesCoRR
18 pages, plus 2 pages of bibliography and 19 pages of ...
Emma Caizergues   +4 more
openaire   +3 more sources

The Incompatibility of the Condorcet Winner and Loser Criteria With Positive Involvement and Resolvability

open access: yesEconomics Letters
We prove that there is no preferential voting method satisfying the Condorcet winner and loser criteria, positive involvement (if a candidate <i>x</i> wins in an initial preference profile, then adding a voter who ranks <i>x</i> uniquely first cannot cause <i>x</i> to lose), and <i>n</i>-voter ...
Wesley H. Holliday
openaire   +3 more sources

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