Condorcet Loser in 2016: Apparently Trump; Condorcet Winner: Not Clinton? [PDF]
Using thermometer score data from the ANES, we show that while there may have been no clear-cut Condorcet winner among the 2016 US presidential candidates, there appears to have been a Condorcet loser: Donald Trump. Thus the surprise is that the electorate preferred not only Hillary Clinton, but also the two “minor” candidates, Gary Johnson and Jill ...
Richard F Potthoff, Michael C Munger
exaly +2 more sources
Mutations in bacterial genes induce unanticipated changes in the relationship between bacterial pathogens in experimental otitis media [PDF]
Otitis media (OM) is a common polymicrobial infection of the middle ear in children under the age of 15 years. A widely used experimental strategy to analyse roles of specific phenotypes of bacterial pathogens of OM is to study changes in co-infection ...
Vinal Lakhani +5 more
doaj +2 more sources
Radial Symmetry Does Not Preclude Condorcet Cycles If Different Voters Weight the Issues Differently
Radial symmetry, by our definition, is a precise condition on continuous ideal-point distributions, rarely if ever found exactly in practice, that is similar to the classical 1967 symmetry condition of Plott but pertains to an infinite electorate; the ...
Richard F Potthoff
exaly +3 more sources
Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes [PDF]
The goal of this paper is to propose a comparison of four multi-winner voting rules, k-Plurality, k-Negative Plurality, k-Borda, and Bloc. These four election methods are extensions of usual scoring rules designed for electing a single winner and are compared on the basis of two criteria.
Mostapha Diss
exaly +4 more sources
Existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have other-regarding preferences [PDF]
In standard political economy models, voters are ‘self-interested’ i.e. care only about ‘own’ utility. However, the emerging evidence indicates that voters often have ‘other-regarding preferences’ (ORP), i.e., in deciding among alternative policies ...
Ali al-Nowaihi, Sanjit Dhami
core +4 more sources
Generating random weak orders and the probability of a Condorcet winner [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Hans Maassen
exaly +5 more sources
Implications of Bounds in Approval Voting
We analyze and show the implications of required limitations on common voting system criteria for the three different versions of voting restrictions in the election website proposed for the Saudi Chamber of Commerce Business Awards.
Kholud Alghamdi, Marius Silaghi
doaj +1 more source
Condorcet Winners and Social Acceptability [PDF]
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Muhammad Mahajne, Oscar Volij
openaire +4 more sources
Preserving Condorcet Winners under Strategic Manipulation
Condorcet extensions have long held a prominent place in social choice theory. A Condorcet extension will return the Condorcet winner as the unique winner whenever such an alternative exists. However, the definition of a Condorcet extension does not take into account possible manipulation by the voters.
Botan, S., Endriss, U.
openaire +3 more sources
The Borda and Condorcet Winners Coincide for Lexicographic Preferences
https://openpolicyfinder.jisc.ac.uk/id/publication ...
Bernardo Moreno, Pietro Salmaso
openaire +3 more sources

