Results 21 to 30 of about 4,335 (155)
Combinatorial Voter Control in Elections [PDF]
Voter control problems model situations such as an external agent trying to affect the result of an election by adding voters, for example by convincing some voters to vote who would otherwise not attend the election.
C. Boutilier +14 more
core +6 more sources
Turnout and Invalid Voting in Brazilian Municipal Elections: A Runoff Voting System Tale
ABSTRACT This paper assesses the impact of Brazil's hybrid mayoral voting system on voters' choices and examines the shift in blank, null, and turnout between the first and second rounds. Using fixed‐effects and RDD techniques over 5570 municipalities between 2000 and 2020, this study shows that runoff voting generates more abstention and invalid ...
Vítor Castro +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Finding Preference Profiles of Condorcet Dimension $k$ via SAT [PDF]
Condorcet winning sets are a set-valued generalization of the well-known concept of a Condorcet winner. As supersets of Condorcet winning sets are always Condorcet winning sets themselves, an interesting property of preference profiles is the size of the
Geist, Christian
core
Condorcet Winner Probabilities - A Statistical Perspective
A Condorcet voting scheme chooses a winning candidate as one who defeats all others in pairwise majority rule. We provide a review which includes the rigorous mathematical treatment for calculating the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner for any number of candidates and value of $n$ odd or even and with arbitrary ran k order probabilities, when ...
Krishnamoorthy, M. S., Raghavachari, M.
openaire +2 more sources
Jean‐Baptiste Say and the Political Economy of Republican Utopia in Revolutionary France
Abstract This article offers a fresh analysis of Olbie (1798), a frequently overlooked essay by the French author and economist Jean‐Baptiste Say (1767–1832). It positions Olbie as a central text for comprehending Say's political thought and situates it within the wider historical context, in particular French republicanism during the 1790s.
MINCHUL KIM
wiley +1 more source
Knowledge Gradient Procedure to Select the Best System Under Pairwise Comparisons
ABSTRACT This article considers fixed‐budget ranking and selection (R&S) problems where the performance of alternative designs can only be assessed through pairwise comparisons, a setting encountered in many applications, including player ranking in games, sports tournaments, recommender systems, image‐based search, public choice models such as voting ...
Dongyang Li +4 more
wiley +1 more source
Single-Elimination Brackets Fail to Approximate Copeland Winner [PDF]
Single-elimination (SE) brackets appear commonly in both sports tournaments and the voting theory literature. In certain tournament models, they have been shown to select the unambiguously-strongest competitor with optimum probability.
Hulett, Reyna
core +1 more source
The right to decide: A decision‐based perspective on corporate stakeholder governance
Abstract Research Summary Complications arise when stakeholders with heterogeneous and potentially misaligned preferences are considered in corporate decisions. This paper examines how high‐level decision‐making corporate forums, such as boards, can address such heterogeneous claims. We identify three corporate stakeholder governance types depending on
Vitor de Barros Santos Freire +2 more
wiley +1 more source
Comparative Flood Potential Zoning. ABSTRACT The study prioritizes sub‐watersheds (SWs) from the Taleqan Watershed in Iran based on Flood Generation Potential (FGP) using Multi‐Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) approaches, including Condorcet, Borda scoring, Fallback bargaining algorithms (Game Theory [GT]), and Best‐Worst Method (BWM), and compares the ...
Seyed Hamidreza Sadeghi +6 more
wiley +1 more source
Income taxation, uncertainty and stability [PDF]
This paper develops a political model to analyze the stability of income tax schedules. It is assumed that agents perceive any proposed alternative tax policy as more uncertain than the status quo. A tax policy is stable if it is a Condorcet winner.
Marhuenda, Francisco +1 more
core +4 more sources

