Results 131 to 140 of about 4,335 (155)

Condorcet winner configurations of linear networks

Optimization, 2010
We consider the problem of locating a fixed number of facilities along a line to serve n players. We model this problem as a cooperative game and assume that any locational configuration can be eventually disrupted through a strict majority of players voting for an alternative configuration.
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Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games �are the generalized Condorcet winners

Social Choice and Welfare, 2004
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Sertel, Murat R., Sanver, M. Remzi
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The Myth of the Condorcet Winner

Supreme Court Economic Review, 2012
There is consensus among legal scholars that, when choosing among multiple alternatives, the Condorcet winner, should it exist, is the preferred option. In this essay, I will refute that claim, both normatively and positively.
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sj-pdf-1-apr-10.1177_1532673X211009499 – Supplemental material for Condorcet Loser in 2016: Apparently Trump; Condorcet Winner: Not Clinton?

2021
Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-apr-10.1177_1532673X211009499 for Condorcet Loser in 2016: Apparently Trump; Condorcet Winner: Not Clinton? by Richard F. Potthoff and Michael C.
Potthoff, Richard F., Munger, Michael C.
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Condorcet winners on four candidates with anonymous voters

Economics Letters, 2001
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A Note on the Probability of Having a Strong Condorcet Winner

Quality and Quantity, 1999
In an election, a strong Condorcet winner is a candidate who is top-ranked by more than 50% of the voters. The purpose of this note is to provide some algebraic representations for the probability of having a strong Condorcet winner in three-candidate elections. Three alternative procedures for generating voting situations are considered: the Impartial
Dominique Lepelley, William V. Gehrlein
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Generalized condorcet-winners for single peaked and single-plateau preferences

Social Choice and Welfare, 1984
The paper presents a new characterisation result of generalized Condorcet Winner (CW) mechanisms based upon Nash's and Arrow's versions of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. (Theorem 1). In the definition of a CW mechanism a certain number of fixed ballots (one less than the number of agents) are the only endogenous parameters.
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Condorcet Winners on Bounded and Distributive Lattices

2019
Aggregating preferences for finding a consensus between several agents is an important topic in social choice theory. We obtain several axiomatic characterizations of some significant subclasses of voting rules defined on bounded and distributive lattices.
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A note on the query complexity of the Condorcet winner problem

Information Processing Letters, 2008
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On Weak Condorcet Winners: Existence and Uniqueness [PDF]

, 2013
Consider a society where each agent has weak preferences over alternatives. The purpose of the society is the selection of alternatives using the majority principle. Then, an alternative x (a weak Condorcet winner) is selected if half or more agents agree that x is as least as good as any other alternative.
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