Results 31 to 40 of about 13,204 (193)
Handling Defeasibilities in Action Domains
Representing defeasibility is an important issue in common sense reasoning. In reasoning about action and change, this issue becomes more difficult because domain and action related defeasible information may conflict with general inertia rules ...
Zhang, Yan
core +1 more source
Does Suppositional Reasoning Solve the Bootstrapping Problem? [PDF]
In a 2002 article Stewart Cohen advances the “bootstrapping problem” for what he calls “basic justification theories,” and in a 2010 followup he offers a solution to the problem, exploiting the idea that suppositional reasoning may be used with ...
Van Cleve, James
core +1 more source
Embedding Defeasible Logic into Logic Programming
Defeasible reasoning is a simple but efficient approach to nonmonotonic reasoning that has recently attracted considerable interest and that has found various applications. Defeasible logic and its variants are an important family of defeasible reasoning
Antoniou, Grigoris +3 more
core +2 more sources
Defeasible logics provide several linguistic features to support the expression of defeasible knowledge. There is also a wide variety of such logics, expressing different intuitions about defeasible reasoning.
Governatori, Guido, Maher, Michael J.
core +1 more source
Local logics, non-monotonicity and defeasible argumentation [PDF]
In this paper we present an embedding of abstract argumentation systems into the framework of Barwise and Seligman’s logic of information flow.We show that, taking P.M.
Bodanza, Gustavo Adrian +1 more
core +1 more source
A System for Modal and Deontic Defeasible Reasoning [PDF]
Defeasible reasoning is a well-established nonmonotonic reasoning approach that has recently been combined with semantic web technologies. This paper describes modal and deontic extensions of defeasible logic, motivated by potential applications for ...
Antoniou, Grigoris +2 more
core +1 more source
A puzzle about enkratic reasoning [PDF]
Enkratic reasoning—reasoning from believing that you ought to do something to an intention to do that thing—seems good. But there is a puzzle about how it could be. Good reasoning preserves correctness, other things equal. But enkratic reasoning does not
Way, Jonathan
core +1 more source
A strike for democracy? Migration, the bigot's veto, and the electoral use of force
Abstract Politicians and philosophers alike have warned that the spread of anti‐migrant bigotry in the Western world requires a tragic trade‐off regarding immigration policy: Although millions of asylum‐seekers might be owed admission to Western democracies, there are many cases where they nonetheless ought to be denied entry, because their admission ...
Shmuel Nili
wiley +1 more source
Jumping to a Conclusion: Fallacies and Standards of Proof
Five errors that fit under the category of jumping to a conclusion are identified: (1) arguing from premises that are insufficient as evidence to prove a conclusion (2) fallacious argument from ignorance, (3) arguing to a wrong conclusion, (4) using ...
Douglas Walton, Thomas F. Gordon
doaj +1 more source
Why Death Is Most in One's Self‐Interest, and Necessarily So
ABSTRACT Most of us think that death is usually not in the self‐interest of the one who dies. Let us momentarily put this belief aside and examine death in a new light. This paper presents a two‐step argument to show why death is most in one's self‐interest, necessarily.
Victor Kriska
wiley +1 more source

