Results 21 to 30 of about 3,807 (197)
Probability, Expected Utility, and the Ellsberg Paradox
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011 The Ellsberg paradox is often cited as evidence for unknowable "ambiguity" versus computable "risk", and a refutation of the Savage axioms regarding expected utility maximization and the program for revealing "subjective" or "belief-type" probabilities.
Thomas Coleman
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Resolving the Ellsberg Paradox by Assuming that People Evaluate Repetitive Sampling [PDF]
, 1999 Ellsberg (1961) designed a decision experiment where most people violated the axioms of rational choice. He asked people to bet on the outcome of certain random events with known and with unknown probabilities. They usually preferred to bet on events with known probabilities.
Hans Schneeweiß
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Daniel Ellsberg on the Ellsberg Paradox
, 2015 Even though Daniel Ellsberg’s 1961 article “Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms” is well-known and increasingly quoted in current decision theory, introducing the counterexample to Bayesian decision-making that got the normative value of Savage’s theory into trouble, its philosophical background remains totally unknown. This paper examines Ellsberg’s
Carlo Zappia
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Asset Pricing Theory in Light of Ellsberg Paradox
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011 In 2008, Epstein and Schneider formulated a microstructure-inspired theory in which one could determine price volatility through a number of other market parameters such as asset volatility, risk free rate and dividend rate. A particular feature of the Epstein-Schneider theory is an extremely high price elasticity of the volatility of a risky stock ...
P. B. Lerner
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Ellsberg Paradox and Second-order Preference Theories on Ambiguity: Some New Experimental Evidence [PDF]
, 2011 We study the two-color problem by Ellsberg (1961) with the modification that the decision maker draws twice with replacement and a different color wins in each draw.
Yang, Chun-Lei, Yao, Lan
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A Unified, Resource-Rational Account of the Allais and Ellsberg Paradoxes
, 2021 Decades of empirical and theoretical research on human decision-making has broadly categorized it into two, separate realms: decision-making under risk and decision-making under uncertainty, with the Allais paradox and the Ellsberg paradox being a prominent example of each, respectively.
Nobandegani, Ardavan S. +2 more
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Good luck, bad luck, and ambiguity aversion [PDF]
Judgment and Decision Making, 2014 We report a series of experiments investigating the influence of feeling lucky or unlucky on people's choice of known-risk or ambiguous options using the traditional Ellsberg Urns decision-making task.
Briony D. Pulford, Poonam Gill
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Simon`s Puzzle: Heuristics in the Process of Making Political Choices [PDF]
Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, 2014 In this article we analyse one of the most fascinating paradoxes of mass politics. Based on the data from the studies of neurobiologists, neurologists, social psychology, cognitive and evolution studies we answer the question specified in literature as ...
Mateusz Wajzer, Tymoteusz Staniucha
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BEHAVIORAL FINANCE: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Фінансово-кредитна діяльність: проблеми теорії та практики, 2021 The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into achievements of scientific studies in various fields which have been reflected in modern finance, particularly in behavioral finance, as well as to consider some patterns of individual behavior which
I. Lyutyy +3 more
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Why Credences Cannot be Imprecise [PDF]
Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, 2014 Beliefs formed under uncertainty come in different grades, which are called credences or degrees of belief. The most common way of measuring the strength of credences is by ascribing probabilities to them.
Borut Trpin
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