Results 11 to 20 of about 196 (135)
Revisiting Ellsberg’s and Machina’s Paradoxes: A Two-Stage Evaluation Model Under Ambiguity [PDF]
Management Science, 2021 In this paper, a two-stage evaluation (TSE) model for decision making under ambiguity is proposed. Events in state space are classified into risky and ambiguous events, which correspond to different types of uncertainty generated by different sources.
Ying He
exaly +2 more sources
Ellsberg paradox: Ambiguity and complexity aversions compared
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2016 We present a simple model where preferences with complexity aversion, rather than ambiguity aversion, resolve the Ellsberg paradox. We test our theory using laboratory experiments where subjects choose among lotteries that “range” from a simple risky lottery, through risky but more complex lotteries, to one similar to Ellsberg’s ambiguity urn.
Jaromir Kovarik, Dan Levin, Levin Dan
exaly +4 more sources
Quantum Decision Theory, Bounded Rationality and the Ellsberg Paradox [PDF]
Studies in Microeconomics, 2019 We test a simple quantum decision model of the Ellsberg paradox. We find that the theoretical predictions of the model are in conformity with our experimental results. The predictions of our quantum model are not statistically significantly different from those of the source dependent model.
Ali Al-Nowaihi
exaly +2 more sources
Common and Distinct Neural Mechanisms Underlying Risk Seeking and Risk Aversion: Evidence From the Neuroimaging Meta-Analysis. [PDF]
Hum Brain MappA comprehensive meta‐analysis on neuroimaging studies of risk seeking and risk aversion was conducted. Risk seeking and risk aversion involve distinct neural activity. Risk seeking is primarily driven by reward. Risk aversion is largely governed by cognitive control systems.
Ding T, Xian P, Jin S, Liu Z, You X.
europepmc +2 more sources
Good luck, bad luck, and ambiguity aversion [PDF]
Judgment and Decision Making, 2014 We report a series of experiments investigating the influence of feeling lucky or unlucky on people's choice of known-risk or ambiguous options using the traditional Ellsberg Urns decision-making task.
Briony D. Pulford, Poonam Gill
doaj +3 more sources
Simon`s Puzzle: Heuristics in the Process of Making Political Choices [PDF]
Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, 2014 In this article we analyse one of the most fascinating paradoxes of mass politics. Based on the data from the studies of neurobiologists, neurologists, social psychology, cognitive and evolution studies we answer the question specified in literature as ...
Mateusz Wajzer, Tymoteusz Staniucha
doaj +1 more source
Quantum structure in economics: The Ellsberg paradox [PDF]
AIP Conference Proceedings, 2012 The 'expected utility hypothesis' and 'Savage's Sure-Thing Principle' are violated in real life decisions, as shown by the 'Allais' and 'Ellsberg paradoxes'. The popular explanation in terms of 'ambiguity aversion' is not completely accepted. As a consequence, uncertainty is still problematical in economics. To overcome these difficulties a distinction
Diederik Aerts, Sandro Sozzo
openaire +4 more sources
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Фінансово-кредитна діяльність: проблеми теорії та практики, 2021 The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into achievements of scientific studies in various fields which have been reflected in modern finance, particularly in behavioral finance, as well as to consider some patterns of individual behavior which
I. Lyutyy +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Why Credences Cannot be Imprecise [PDF]
Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, 2014 Beliefs formed under uncertainty come in different grades, which are called credences or degrees of belief. The most common way of measuring the strength of credences is by ascribing probabilities to them.
Borut Trpin
doaj +1 more source
A Contextual Risk Model for the Ellsberg Paradox [PDF]
Journal of Engineering Science and Technology Review, 2011 The Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes show that the expected utility hypothesis and Savage's Sure-Thing Principle are violated in real life decisions. The popular explanation in terms of 'ambiguity aversion' is not completely accepted. On the other hand, we have recently introduced a notion of 'contextual risk' to mathematically capture what is known as ...
Diederik Aerts, Sandro Sozzo
openaire +4 more sources