Results 21 to 30 of about 506 (164)
Good luck, bad luck, and ambiguity aversion [PDF]
We report a series of experiments investigating the influence of feeling lucky or unlucky on people's choice of known-risk or ambiguous options using the traditional Ellsberg Urns decision-making task.
Briony D. Pulford, Poonam Gill
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Decision-Making Paradoxes in Humans vs Machines: The case of the Allais and Ellsberg Paradoxes. [PDF]
Human decision-making is filled with a variety of paradoxes demonstrating deviations from rationality principles. Do state-of-the-art artificial intelligence (AI) models also manifest these paradoxes when making decisions? As a case study, in this work we investigate whether GPT-4, a recently released state-of-the-art language model, would show two ...
Nobandegani, Ardavan S. +2 more
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Simon`s Puzzle: Heuristics in the Process of Making Political Choices [PDF]
In this article we analyse one of the most fascinating paradoxes of mass politics. Based on the data from the studies of neurobiologists, neurologists, social psychology, cognitive and evolution studies we answer the question specified in literature as ...
Mateusz Wajzer, Tymoteusz Staniucha
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Quantum structure in economics: The Ellsberg paradox [PDF]
The 'expected utility hypothesis' and 'Savage's Sure-Thing Principle' are violated in real life decisions, as shown by the 'Allais' and 'Ellsberg paradoxes'. The popular explanation in terms of 'ambiguity aversion' is not completely accepted. As a consequence, uncertainty is still problematical in economics. To overcome these difficulties a distinction
Diederik Aerts, Sandro Sozzo
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BEHAVIORAL FINANCE: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The purpose of this paper is to provide insights into achievements of scientific studies in various fields which have been reflected in modern finance, particularly in behavioral finance, as well as to consider some patterns of individual behavior which
I. Lyutyy +3 more
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Why Credences Cannot be Imprecise [PDF]
Beliefs formed under uncertainty come in different grades, which are called credences or degrees of belief. The most common way of measuring the strength of credences is by ascribing probabilities to them.
Borut Trpin
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A Contextual Risk Model for the Ellsberg Paradox [PDF]
The Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes show that the expected utility hypothesis and Savage's Sure-Thing Principle are violated in real life decisions. The popular explanation in terms of 'ambiguity aversion' is not completely accepted. On the other hand, we have recently introduced a notion of 'contextual risk' to mathematically capture what is known as ...
Diederik Aerts, Sandro Sozzo
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A Quantum Model for the Ellsberg and Machina Paradoxes [PDF]
The Ellsberg and Machina paradoxes reveal that expected utility theory is problematical when real subjects take decisions under uncertainty. Suitable generalizations of expected utility exist which attempt to solve the Ellsberg paradox, but none of them provides a satisfactory solution of the Machina paradox.
Diederik Aerts +2 more
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Ellsberg paradox in decision theory posits that people will inevitably choose a known probability of winning over an unknown probability of winning even if the known probability is low [1].
Song-Ju Kim, Taiki Takahashi
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A Quantum Cognition Analysis of the Ellsberg Paradox [PDF]
11 ...
Diederik Aerts +2 more
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