Results 261 to 270 of about 133,491 (305)

Are Conspiracy Beliefs Epistemically Innocent?

Philosophical Topics, 2023
When people share a nonmainstream explanation of a significant event and the explanation involves a plot, that explanation is often called a conspiracy theory. As Karen Douglas and her collaborators have persuasively argued, conspiracy theories respond to people’s need for a causal explanation of the significant event, and also address their needs for ...
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Epistemic Profiles and Belief Structures

2012
The paper is devoted to a novel formalization of beliefs in multiagent systems. Our aim is to bridge the gap between idealized logical approaches to modeling beliefs and their actual implementations. Therefore the stages of belief acquisition, intermediate reasoning and final belief formation are isolated and analyzed.
Barbara Dunin-Kęplicz, Andrzej Szałas
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Epistemic conservatism and bare beliefs

Synthese, 2018
My subject is the kind of Epistemic Conservatism (EC) that says that an agent is in some measure justified in maintaining a belief simply in virtue of the fact that the agent has that belief. Quine’s alternative to positivist foundationalism, Chisholmian particularism, Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, and Bayesianism all seem to rely on EC. I argue that,
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Epistemic Virtue and Justified Belief

2001
Abstract A major presupposition of ethics is that our moral lives can be conducted well or poorly. Our intellectual lives—our questioning and judging, our reflection and inference, our criticism and responses to criticism—can also be conducted well or poorly.
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Interactive beliefs, epistemic independence and strong rationalizability

Research in Economics, 1999
Abstract We use a universal, extensive form interactive beliefs system to provide an epistemic characterization of a weak and a strong notion of rationalizability with independent beliefs. The weak solution concept is equivalent to backward induction in generic perfect information games where no player moves more than once in any play.
Battigalli P., Siniscalchi M.
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Self-Beliefs and Epistemic Justifications

2023
I explore the epistemic justification of self-beliefs regarding personality traits within the internalism-externalism debate. Historically, the question of epistemic justification of self-beliefs has been discussed only with respect to our beliefs about our current mental states while the epistemic justification of our self-beliefs about our ...
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Epistemic Beliefs and Teacher Education

2019
The chapter considers the implications of incorporating the epistemic core (i.e. aims and values, practices, methods and knowledge) in pre-service teacher education. Research on teachers’ knowledge and epistemic beliefs as well as related concepts such as personal epistemologies and epistemic cognition are highlighted.
Sibel Erduran, Ebru Kaya
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Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation

2001
Abstract Feldman defends the view that epistemic justification is analyzable in terms of an epistemic ‘ought’ against the objection that, unlike action, belief is not under voluntary control, which it would have to be if epistemic justification is indeed a function of what we ought to believe.
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Internalism and epistemically responsible belief

Synthese, 1990
In section one the deontological (or responsibilist) conception of justification is discussed and explained. In section two, arguments are put forward in order to derive the most plausible version of perspectival internalism, or the position that epistemic justification is a function of factors internal to the believer's cognitive perspective.
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Belief Worlds and Epistemic Possibilities

1998
This paper develops an individualistic, belief-based account for a limited class of epistemic possibility statements. Section I establishes the need for such an account by reviewing a recent version of the majority view (the "Relevant Community Account") and contesting two key assumptions.
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