Results 61 to 70 of about 330 (74)
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The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification
Philosophical Perspectives, 1988The terms, 'justified', 'justification', and their cognates are most naturally understood in what we may term a "deontological" way, as having to do with obligation, permission, requirement, blame, and the like. We may think of requirement, prohibition, and permission as the basic deontological terms, with obligation, and duty as species of requirement,
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification: a reassessment
Synthese, 2011This paper undertakes two projects: Firstly, it offers a new account of the so-called deontological conception of epistemic justification (DCEJ). Secondly, it brings out the basic weaknesses of DCEJ, thus accounted for. It concludes that strong reasons speak against its acceptance.
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification and doxastic voluntarism
Analysis, 1994According to the deontological conception of epistemic justification as endorsed by most traditional epistemologists, one is justified in holding a belief if and only if one is in the clear, or epistemically responsible, in holding the belief. William Alston criticizes this conception and any theory of epistemic justification based on this conception ...
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Hobartian Voluntarism: Grounding a Deontological Conceptionof Epistemic Justification
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2000Our concept of epistemic justification is often thought to be deontological, so that justified and unjustified are epistemic terms of praise and blame. This conception of justification requires the truth of voluntarism - the thesis that we have control over our beliefs which seems false. I attempt to present a mostly plausible version of voluntarism by
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Epistemic Deontologism and Strong Doxastic Voluntarism: A Defense
Dialogue, 2015The following claims are independently plausible but jointly inconsistent: (1) epistemic deontologism is correct (i.e., there are some beliefs we ought to have, and some beliefs we ought not to have); (2) we have no voluntary control over our beliefs; (3) S’s lack of control over whether she φs implies that S has no obligation to φ or to not φ (i.e ...
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‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism
Synthese, 2017According to epistemic deontologism, attributions of epistemic justification are deontic claims about what we ought to believe. One of the most prominent objections to this conception, due mainly to William P. Alston, is that the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (OIC) rules out deontologism because our beliefs are not under our voluntary control ...
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Chisholming away at Plantinga's critique of epistemic deontology
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1998openaire +2 more sources
On Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification: A Criticism and an Alternative
CHUL HAK SA SANG - Journal of Philosophical Ideas, 2013openaire +1 more source