Results 251 to 260 of about 91,319 (282)

Epistemic Equality: Distributive Epistemic Justice in the Context of Justification

Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 2022
Social inequality may obstruct the generation of knowledge, as the rich and powerful may bring about social acceptance of skewed views that suit their interests. Epistemic equality in the context of justification is a means of preventing such obstruction.
Boaz, Miller, Meital, Pinto
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Epistemic Justification Revisited

Journal of Philosophical Research, 2016
In his Beyond Justification, Bill Alston argued that there is no single property picked out by ‘epistemic justification,’ and that instead epistemological theory should investigate the range of epistemic desiderata that beliefs may enjoy (as well as the nature of and interconnections among the various epistemic good-making properties).
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Justification, epistemic

2018
The term ‘justification’ belongs to a cluster of normative terms that also includes ‘rational’, ‘reasonable’ and ‘warranted’. All these are commonly used in epistemology, but there is no generally agreed way of understanding them, nor is there even agreement as to whether they are synonymous.
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Epistemic Justification

2001
Abstract Modern disputes about what makes a belief epistemically justified or rational are flawed through failing to recognize that there are different kinds of justifications that are in different ways indicative that the belief is true.
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Atheism and epistemic justification

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2014
In a recent article in this journal, Andrew Johnson seeks to defend the “New Atheism” against several objections. We provide a philosophical assessment of his defense of contemporary atheistic arguments that are said to amount to bifurcation fallacies.
J. Angelo Corlett, Josh Cangelosi
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Intensionality and Epistemic Justification

Philosophia, 2012
The purpose of this paper is to raise a new objection to externalist process reliabilism about epistemic justification. The objection is that epistemic justification is intensional—it does not permit the substitution of co-referring expressions—and reliabilism cannot accommodate that.
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Seemings and Epistemic Justification

2020
This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind. It also explores the significance of the findings of this examination for the general debate on epistemic justification.
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