Results 11 to 20 of about 1,047,095 (303)
Background. Multiple Nash equilibria bring a new problem of selecting amongst them but this problem is solved by refining the equilibria. However, none of the existing refinements can guarantee a single refined Nash equilibrium.
Vadim V. Romanuke
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On (Subgame Perfect) Secure Equilibrium in Quantitative Reachability Games [PDF]
We study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In such games, each player aims at reaching his own goal set of states as soon as possible.
Thomas Brihaye +3 more
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Relational Concurrent Refinement: Timed Refinement [PDF]
Data refinement in a state-based language such as Z is defined using a relational model in terms of the behaviour of abstract programs. Downward and upward simulation conditions form a sound and jointly complete methodology to verify relational data ...
Derrick, John +4 more
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Introducing extra operations in refinement [PDF]
This paper reconsiders refinements which introduce actions on the concrete level which were not present at the abstract level. It considers a range of different basic refinement relations, covering the standard ones for formalisms like Event-B, Z ...
Boiten, Eerke Albert
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For hypereutectic Nb-Si based alloys, primary Nb5Si3 phases typically grow in a faceted mode during equilibrium or near-equilibrium solidification, which damages the ductility and toughness.
Yueling Guo +3 more
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Relational Concurrent Refinement: Automata [PDF]
Data refinement in a state-based language such as Z is defined using a relational model in terms of the behaviour of abstract programs. Downward and upward simulation conditions form a sound and jointly complete methodology to verify relational data ...
Derrick, John +4 more
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Exploring the Gap between Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium
In (Bonanno, 2013), a solution concept for extensive-form games, called perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE), was introduced and shown to be a strict refinement of subgame-perfect equilibrium; it was also shown that, in turn, sequential equilibrium (SE) is
Giacomo Bonanno
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Perspicuity and Granularity in Refinement [PDF]
This paper reconsiders refinements which introduce actions on the concrete level which were not present at the abstract level. It draws a distinction between concrete actions which are ''perspicuous'' at the abstract level, and changes of granularity of ...
Eerke Boiten, Boiten, Eerke Albert
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Refinements of the Nash equilibrium have followed the strategy of extending the idea of subgame perfection to incomplete information games. This has been achieved by appropriately restricting beliefs at unreached information sets.
Asha Sadanand
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A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium [PDF]
Most analyses of reputations in game theory are founded on the notion of equilibrium. I show that meaningful reputations may develop in the absence of equilibria. I study a game in which a long-run player faces an infinite sequence of short-run opponents who observe all previous play. \textit{D. Fudenberg} and \textit{D. K. Levine} [Econometrica 57, No.
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