Results 261 to 270 of about 1,047,095 (303)

Refinement of proper equilibrium points

Optimization, 1995
In this paper we refine the concept of proper equilibrium point for n-person normal games due to Myerson 1978. We introduce the g-proper equilibrium points which we prove the existence under the condition of [ILM 0001]. They compare the strategy weight compounded not homogeneously.
E. Marchi, A. Neme
exaly   +2 more sources

On equilibrium refinements in supermodular games [PDF]

International Journal of Game Theory, 2014
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau, Richard McLean
openaire   +3 more sources

ON EQUILIBRIUM REFINEMENT FOR DISCONTINUOUS GAMES [PDF]

International Game Theory Review, 2011
In moving from finite-action to infinite-action games, standard refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept cease to satisfy certain "natural" properties. For instance, perfect equilibria in compact, continuous games need not be admissible. This paper highlights additional properties of two standard refinement specifications that are not inherited by ...
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A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium

Econometrica, 1987
Summary: We propose a refinement of sequential equilibrium for extensive form games by generalizing a restriction proposed for signaling games by the author and \textit{D. M. Kreps} [Q. J. Econ. 102, 179--221 (1987; Zbl 0626.90098)]. The restriction is that beliefs must not assign positive weight to the possibilities that can be excluded through ...
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Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements

Econometrica, 1991
This paper develops a decision-theoretic approach to normal-form refinements of Nash equilibrium and provides characterizations of (normal-form) perfect equilibrium and proper equilibrium. The approach relies on a theory of single-person decision-making that is a non-Archimedean version of subjective expected utility theory.
Blume, Lawrence, Brandenburger, Adam, Dekel, Eddie   +2 more
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On the Inconsistency of Equilibrium Refinement

Theory and Decision, 2002
The author considers finite \(n\)-person games in normal form. \textit{H. Norde, J. Potters, H. Reijnierse} and \textit{D. Vermeulen} [Games and Econ. Behav. 12, No. 2, 219--225 (1996; Zbl 0848.90132)] proved that each solution concept satisfying non-emptiness, optimality, and consistency axioms coincides with the Nash equilibrium concept.
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Refinements of Nash Equilibrium: A critique

Theory and Decision, 1989
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Nash equilibrium, refinements of

2010
Game theory studies decisions by several persons in situations with significant interactions. Two features distinguish it from other theories of multi-person decisions. One is explicit consideration of each person’s available strategies and the outcomes resulting from combinations of their choices; that is, a complete and detailed specification of the ‘
Steven N. Durlauf, Lawrence E. Blume
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Refinements of Nash Equilibrium

2005
This paper describes ways that the definition of an equilibrium among players' strategies in a game can be sharpened by invoking additional criteria derived from decision theory. Refinements of John Nash's 1950 definition aim primarily to distinguish equilibria in which implicit commitments are credible due to incentives.
Srihari Govindan, Robert B. Wilson
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Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games

Journal of Economic Theory, 1994
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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