Results 31 to 40 of about 161 (152)
Sleeping Beauty and the demands of non‐ideal rationality
Noûs, Volume 59, Issue 4, Page 1072-1092, December 2025.Abstract If an agent can't live up to the demands of ideal rationality, fallback norms come into play that take into account the agent's limitations. A familiar human limitation is our tendency to lose information. How should we compensate for this tendency?
Wolfgang Schwarz
wiley +1 more source
EVIDENCE AND FALSIFICATION: CHALLENGES TO GREGORY PETERSON
Zygon, 2008 In this reply to Gregory Peterson's essay “Maintaining Respectability,” which itself is a response to my “Is Theology Respectable as Metaphysics?” I elaborate upon my claims that theology treats God's existence as an absolute certainty immune to ...
doaj +2 more sources
The Ubiquity of Higher‐Order Defeat
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 106, Issue 4, Page 231-241, December 2025.ABSTRACT Evidence for cognitive impairment—say, by bias or hypoxia—can defeat the epistemic permissibility of belief. This paper argues that such higher‐order defeat is an instance of a more basic normative phenomenon: whenever the permissibility of one's belief is defeated, it is defeated by an epistemic reason to withhold belief that is provided by ...
Sebastian Schmidt
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Philosophical Issues, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 115-125, October 2025.ABSTRACT Having evidence does not in itself make a doxastic attitude justified even if the evidence supports the attitude in question. Plausibly, one must also appreciate the support one's evidence provides for the doxastic attitude. Although such appreciation seems central to the picture of justification offered by Evidentialism, its nature has been ...
Kevin McCain
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Philosophical Issues, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 17-28, October 2025.ABSTRACT When does an agent possess a proposition P as evidence? According to Timothy Williamson, the answer is when, and only when, they know that P. Call this view E = K. In this article, I point out an unwanted consequence of E = K, which is that people who suffer from anxiety have impoverished empirical evidence due to their anxiety.
Rhys Borchert
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Political Epistemology, Rationality, and Externalism About Bias
Philosophical Issues, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 93-104, October 2025.ABSTRACT This article develops and defends the idea that some of our biases have an externalist character, with particular attention to cases in which the phenomenon arises in political contexts. A person who consistently defers to biased sources can count as biased even while responding impeccably to their total evidence. On the basis of such cases, I
Thomas Kelly
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Religious Experience, Pragmatic Encroachment, and Justified Belief in God
Open Theology, 2020 The secondary literature on religious epistemology has focused extensively on whether religious experience can provide evidence for God’s existence. In this article, I suppose that religious experience can do this, but I consider whether it can provide ...
Gillham Alex R
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Philosophical Issues, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 51-62, October 2025.ABSTRACT It has recently been argued that purported evidential and zetetic norms issue contradictory verdicts and that such contradictions best be resolved in favor of zetetic norms. The paper argues that this line of argument proves unsuccessful. First, natural formulations of what one ought to do if inquiring into a given matter resemble anankastic ...
Julien Dutant +2 more
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Evidentiality in Spoken Catalan. The Evidential Marker "diu que"
Anuari de Filologia. Estudis de Lingüística, 2020 This study deals with an Catalan evidential marker without a written tradition, but mainly an oral one: diu que (‘(s)he.says.that’, ‘it is said that’), a Romance correlate for dizque (Spanish) or dice che (Italian) (cf. Travis 2006, Cruschina 2015, Alcázar 2018).
Jordi M. Antolí Martínez +1 more
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Entitlement, Disagreement and Cognitive Disaster
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 106, Issue 3, Page 144-154, September 2025.ABSTRACT Epistemologists debate whether it is rationally permissible for people to disagree, for example in politics or religion, while nevertheless regarding each other's opinions as reasonable. I consider this question in relation to Crispin Wright's Wittgensteinian notion of entitlement, that is, rational warrant without evidence.
Michael Thorne
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