Results 281 to 290 of about 784,857 (332)
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Journal of Economic Theory, 2016
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Arieli, Itai, Babichenko, Yakov
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zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Arieli, Itai, Babichenko, Yakov
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2005
Abstract Introduces extensive form games. Informations structures—perfect, imperfect, and incomplete information are explained. Pure behavioural and mixed strategies are defined. Finally, perfect recall and the equivalence of mixed and behavioural strategies (in terms of end point distributions) is considered.
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Abstract Introduces extensive form games. Informations structures—perfect, imperfect, and incomplete information are explained. Pure behavioural and mixed strategies are defined. Finally, perfect recall and the equivalence of mixed and behavioural strategies (in terms of end point distributions) is considered.
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2019
This chapter deals with games in extensive form. Here an explicit evolution of the interaction is given, describing precisely when each player plays, what actions are available and what information is available to each player when he makes a decision.
Rida Laraki +2 more
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This chapter deals with games in extensive form. Here an explicit evolution of the interaction is given, describing precisely when each player plays, what actions are available and what information is available to each player when he makes a decision.
Rida Laraki +2 more
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Fictitious Play in Extensive Form Games
Games and Economic Behavior, 1996zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Hendon, Ebbe +2 more
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2017
This chapter discusses a number of key concepts for extensive form game representation. It first considers a matrix that defines a zero-sum matrix game for which the minimizer has two actions and the maximizer has three actions and shows that the matrix description, by itself, does not capture the information structure of the game and, in fact, other ...
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This chapter discusses a number of key concepts for extensive form game representation. It first considers a matrix that defines a zero-sum matrix game for which the minimizer has two actions and the maximizer has three actions and shows that the matrix description, by itself, does not capture the information structure of the game and, in fact, other ...
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2007
Because all players choose their strategies simultaneously, normal form representations of games are static. Many applications in political science, however, involve players choosing strategies sequentially. Although it is possible to model these situations as games in the normal form, it is often easier and more satisfying to use the extensive form,
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Because all players choose their strategies simultaneously, normal form representations of games are static. Many applications in political science, however, involve players choosing strategies sequentially. Although it is possible to model these situations as games in the normal form, it is often easier and more satisfying to use the extensive form,
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2015
A game in extensive form specifies when each player in the game has to move, what his information is about the sequence of previous moves, which chance moves occur, and what the final payoffs are. Such games are discussed in Chaps. 4 and 5, and also occur in Chaps. 6 and 7. The present chapter extends the material introduced in Chaps.
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A game in extensive form specifies when each player in the game has to move, what his information is about the sequence of previous moves, which chance moves occur, and what the final payoffs are. Such games are discussed in Chaps. 4 and 5, and also occur in Chaps. 6 and 7. The present chapter extends the material introduced in Chaps.
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2001
In this chapter we present the model of extensive form games that will be used throughout this book. As a first step, Section 2.1 introduces a formal way to represent the “rules” of the game, which we refer to as the extensive form structure of a game.
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In this chapter we present the model of extensive form games that will be used throughout this book. As a first step, Section 2.1 introduces a formal way to represent the “rules” of the game, which we refer to as the extensive form structure of a game.
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2018
After a slight reformulation of the sequential equilibrium concept, we display the set of sequential equilibria of a finite extensive form game as the set of fixed points of a upper hemicontinuous contractible valued best response correspondence. A simple signalling game illustrates the main concepts, after which we lay out the formalism of extensive ...
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After a slight reformulation of the sequential equilibrium concept, we display the set of sequential equilibria of a finite extensive form game as the set of fixed points of a upper hemicontinuous contractible valued best response correspondence. A simple signalling game illustrates the main concepts, after which we lay out the formalism of extensive ...
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Extensive Form Generalized Games
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017This paper introduces extensive form generalized games, a general framework for modeling dynamic strategic settings where players' feasible strategies depend on the strategies chosen by others. Extensive form generalized games nest a variety of existing game theoretic frameworks, including games with bounded rationality, endogenous information ...
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