Results 251 to 260 of about 2,599,230 (282)

Consciousness from a first-person perspective

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1991
The sequence of topics in this reply roughly follows that of the target article. The latter focused largely on experimental studies of how consciousness relates to human information processing, tracing their relation from input through to output. The discussion of the implications of the findings both for cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind was
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Self and First-Person Perspective

2012
The only consistent theme to be found in the phenomenological literature on the concept of self is constant disagreement. Husserl begins the discussion by disagreeing with a certain tradition concerning the concept of the ego, and then later comes to disagree with himself.
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Representation and the First-Person Perspective

Synthese, 2006
The orthodox view in the study of representation is that a strictly third-person objective methodology must be employed. The acceptance of this methodology is shown to be a fundamental and debilitating error. Toward this end I defend what I call “the particularity requirement, ”discuss an important distinction between representers and information ...
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Persistence and the First-Person Perspective

The Philosophical Review, 2009
When one considers one's own persistence over time from the first-person perspective, it seems as if facts about one's persistence are “further facts,” over and above facts about physical and psychological continuity. But the idea that facts about one's persistence are further facts is objectionable on independent theoretical grounds: it conflicts with
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Perception from the First‐Person Perspective

European Journal of Philosophy, 2013
AbstractThis paper develops a view of the content of perceptual states that reflects the cognitive significance those states have for the subject. Perhaps the most important datum for such a theory is the intuition that experiences are ‘transparent’, an intuition promoted by philosophers as diverse as Sartre and Dretske.
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Subjectivity and the First‐Person Perspective

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 2007
AbstractPhenomenology and analytical philosophy share a number of common concerns, and it seems obvious that analytical philosophy can learn from phenomenology, just as phenomenology can profit from an exchange with analytical philosophy. But although I think it would be a pity to miss the opportunity for dialogue that is currently at hand, I will in ...
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Occupational Science and the First‐Person Perspective

Journal of Occupational Science, 2006
Abstract The individualistic tendencies in occupational science can be explained in part by its proponents’ reliance on “the interpretive tradition” originating in Weberian sociology and phenomenological philosophy, and taking account of what an actor from his or her first‐person perspective means by an action. From within this interpretive perspective,
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Normativity from the First-Person Perspective

Abstract I begin with a distinction between two broad kinds of motivation that may lead one to adopt anti-realism about value: the ‘naturalist’ anti-realist worries that real value cannot be properly integrated into a naturalistic worldview, and so concludes that value grounded in our evaluative attitudes is simply the best we can do ...
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‘I’ and the First Person Perspective

1998
Do the special features of 'I' have epistemological and metaphysical implications? Many philosophers have thought so. Here I investigate the relation between the first person singular pronoun 'I' and the first person perspective, construed as the perspective of consciousness. First, I discuss the semantics of 'I' as a lexeme of a natural language.
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Value Realism and the First-Person Perspective

2019
In this project, I develop ideas from recent work in the philosophy of mind in order to offer a positive and novel argument for value realism. The central move is a (re)consideration of the sorts of psychological attitudes—desires, beliefs, judgments, intentions, and so on—that have typically served as the basis for the wide variety of anti-realist ...
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