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The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring

open access: yes
"Selection in Dynamic Games" 1. Assortative Matching with costly search, presented by Alp Atakan 2. A Refinement of Sequential Equilibrium with Application to Decentralized Collusion, presented by Peter Eso 3.
Wojciech Olszewski, Johannes Horner
core  

The Folk theorem for dominance solutions

open access: yes
The known variants of the Folk theorem characterize the sets of equilibria for repeated games. The present paper considers dominance solutions of finitely repeated games and discounted supergames with perturbed payoff functions.
Alexander Vasin
core  

Sampling can be faster than optimization. [PDF]

open access: yesProc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 2019
Ma YA   +4 more
europepmc   +1 more source

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