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More on the “anti-folk theorem”
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1989Abstract For discounted repeated games with unobservable individual deviations, Kaneko's “anti-folk theorem” states that the set of Nash-equilibrium plays coincides with the set of sequences of one-shot Nash-equilibrium plays. When the payoff criterion is long-run average, however, Kaneko's characterization is of a different sort.
Jordi Masso, Robert W. Rosenthal
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A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games
Review of Economic Studies, 2002zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Folk theorems in multicriteria repeated N-person games
Top, 2002zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Petrosjan, L., Puerto, J.
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Folk theorems in overlapping generations games
Games and Economic Behavior, 1992zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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A Folk Theorem of Monetary Policy
1988The analysis of effectiveness and optimality of economic policy by using game theory is a crucial issue of contemporary macroeconomics. International policy coordination and the role of monetary policy are the topics more frequently analysed.
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Finitely repeated games: A generalized Nash folk theorem
Games and Economic Behavior, 2006zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis [PDF]
, 1996 We present a synthesis of the various folk theorems for repeated games using a model that accommodates both finitely and infinitely repeated games with discounting. We derive a central result for this model and show that the various folk theorems follow as a consequence.
Benoit, Jean-Pierre, Krishna, Vijay
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Folk Theorem with One-sided Information
Review of Economic Dynamics, 2000A game with one-sided moral hazard is represented by a two-stage games. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the folk theorem to hold. Equilibrium payoffs are generated by payoffs from pure strategy profiles which do not admit profitable nondetectable deviations.
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Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring
Review of Economic Studies, 2022Takuo Sugaya
exaly