Results 161 to 170 of about 809,468 (200)
Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.
A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
Journal of Economic Theory, 2013zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Michael Peters +1 more
openaire +1 more source
The “Folk Theorem” in Nuclear Physics
Effective Field Theories for Nuclei and Compact-Star Matter, 2018openaire +2 more sources
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
Econometrica, 1994zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Abreu, Dilip +2 more
openaire +1 more source
A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
Games and Economic Behavior, 2013The set of all Bayesian–Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by making conditional commitments at the interim stage of a Bayesian game coincides with the set of all feasible, incentive compatible and interim individually rational payoffs of the Bayesian game.
openaire +2 more sources
A counterexample to the folk theorem with discounting
Economics Letters, 1986zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Forges, F., Mertens, J. F., Neyman, A.
openaire +1 more source
The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis [PDF]
, 1996 We present a synthesis of the various folk theorems for repeated games using a model that accommodates both finitely and infinitely repeated games with discounting. We derive a central result for this model and show that the various folk theorems follow as a consequence.
Benoit, Jean-Pierre, Krishna, Vijay
openaire +2 more sources
A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games
Review of Economic Studies, 2002zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire +2 more sources
Why Does the Folk Theorem Do Not Seem to Work When It Is Mostly Needed?
Social Science Research Network, 2023Johann Caro-Burnett +2 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
Learning to Collude: A Partial Folk Theorem for Smooth Fictitious Play
Social Science Research Network, 2022Á. Cartea +3 more
semanticscholar +1 more source
The "Folk Theorem" for Repeated Games with Complete Information
Econometrica, 1994Folk theorems of \textit{D. Fudenberg} and \textit{E. Maskin} [Econometrica 54, 533-554 (1986; Zbl 0615.90099)] require that the payoff space is full dimensional in games with more than two players. The full dimensionality is weakened to the non-equivalent utility (NEU) condition by \textit{D. Abreu}, \textit{P. K. Dutta} and \textit{L.
openaire +2 more sources