Results 151 to 160 of about 809,468 (200)

A functional contextual, observer-centric, quantum mechanical, and neuro-symbolic approach to solving the alignment problem of artificial general intelligence: safe AI through intersecting computational psychological neuroscience and LLM architecture for emergent theory of mind. [PDF]

Front Comput Neurosci
Edwards DJ.
europepmc   +1 more source

The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information [PDF]

Drew Fudenberg, Eric Maskin
core  

Efficiency and resilience of cooperation in asymmetric social dilemmas. [PDF]

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
Hübner V, Staab M, Hilbe C, Chatterjee K, Kleshnina M.   +4 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Self-control problems and the folk theorem

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2019
This paper generalizes the basic complete information pure-action folk theorem such that it applies when discounting is present-biased and the discount factor between two successive periods increases with the waiting time until the periods are reached ...
Axel Bernergård
exaly   +3 more sources

The folk theorem revisited

Economic Theory, 2006
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
James Bergin
exaly   +4 more sources

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A Folk Theorem for Asynchronously Repeated Games

Econometrica, 2001
Summary: We prove a Folk Theorem for asynchronously repeated games in which the set of players who can move in period \(t\), denoted by \(I_t\) is a random variable whose distribution is a function of the past action choices of the players and the past realizations of \(I_\tau\)'s, \(\tau=1,2,\dots,t-1\).
Kiho Yoon
exaly   +3 more sources

A Folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon

Economic Theory, 2015
Chantal Marlats
exaly   +3 more sources

The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Time-Dependent Discounting

Mathematics of Operations Research, 2021
This paper defines a general framework to study infinitely repeated games with time-dependent discounting in which we distinguish and discuss both time-consistent and -inconsistent preferences.
Daehyun Kim, Xiaoxi Li
semanticscholar   +1 more source

The Folk theorem for dominance solutions [PDF]

International Journal of Game Theory, 1999
The author considers repeated games with a discount factor for the payoff function. He shows that in a supergame with perturbed payoff, the set of dominance solution payoff vectors converges to the set of individually rational convex combinations of payoff vectors in the stage game, as the number of stages tends to infinity, and the perturbation of the
openaire   +2 more sources

On folk theorems

Communications of the ACM, 1980
We suggest criteria for a statement to be a folk theorem and illustrate the ideas with a detailed example.
openaire   +2 more sources